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individual differences in a broad range of learning paradigms. We illustrate the model’s explanatory
scope by simulating several benchmarks, including the classic Six Problems, the 5-4 problem, and linear
separability. Beyond the common approach of predicting average response probabilities, we also propose
explanations for more recently studied phenomena that challenge existing learning accounts, regarding
task instructions, individual differences in rule extrapolation in three different tasks, individual attention
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Abstract
We introduce the CAL model (Category Abstraction Learning), a cognitive framework
formally describing category learning built on similarity-based generalization,
dissimilarity-based abstraction, two attention learning mechanisms, error-driven
knowledge structuring, and stimulus memorization. Our hypotheses draw on an array of
empirical and theoretical insights connecting reinforcement and category learning. The
key novelty of the model is its explanation of how rules are learned from scratch based
on three central assumptions. (1) Category rules emerge from two processes of stimulus
generalization (similarity) and its direct inverse (category contrast) on independent
dimensions. (2) Two attention mechanisms guide learning by focusing on rules, or on
the contexts in which they produce errors. (3) Knowing about these contexts inhibits
executing the rule, without correcting it, and consequently leads to applying partial
rules in different situations. The model is designed to capture both systematic and
individual differences in a broad range of learning paradigms. We illustrate the model’s
explanatory scope by simulating several benchmarks, including the classic Six Problems,
the 5–4 problem, and linear separability. Beyond the common approach of predicting
average response probabilities, we also propose explanations for more recently studied
phenomena that challenge existing learning accounts, regarding task instructions,
individual differences in rule extrapolation in three different tasks, individual attention
shifts to stimulus features during learning, and other phenomena. We discuss CAL’s
relation to different models, and its potential to measure the cognitive processes
regarding attention, abstraction, error detection, and memorization from multiple
psychological perspectives.
Keywords: Category Learning, Generalization, Abstraction, Attention, Executive
Control
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Classifying objects based on rules happens daily (e.g., classifying whether
something is a bird or not, based on the feature “has wings”). How humans represent
such rules is still under debate. On the one hand, some researchers propose that
category membership is inferred based on the relative similarity to known category
members or clusters stored in memory while learning how to focus attention to stimulus
features that reliably predict categories (e.g. to “wings”; Kruschke, 1992; Love, Medin,
& Gureckis, 2004; Nosofsky, 1986; see further, Hahn & Chater, 1998; Pothos & Wills,
2011). On the other hand, rule theories presuppose (verbal or deliberate) decision
criteria such as decision bounds (e.g., Ashby & Gott, 1988; Reed, 1972), or decision
trees (e.g., Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994). However, there are many situations
in which humans seem to jointly rely on (abstracted) rules and instance memory (e.g.,
predicting ‘bird’ when wings are observed, but recognizing exceptions, such as ‘bats’
and ‘aircraft’; see M. R. Blair & Homa, 2001; Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Palmeri &
Nosofsky, 1995; see also Hahn, Prat-Sala, Pothos, & Brumby, 2010), which has inspired
theories that assume a co-existence of corresponding decision strategies or brain systems
(see Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Waldron, et al., 1998; Bröder, Gräf, & Kieslich, 2017;
Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Hahn & Chater, 1998; Haygood & Bourne, 1965; Kruschke,
2005; Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994; Poldrack & Foerde, 2008; Pothos & Wills,
2011).
One problem in the domain of category learning is that most models do not
explain how the cognitive representations underlying ‘rules’ are created (i.e., learned; in
the sense of decision bounds, hypothetical priors, or relational primitives; for related
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discussions see Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2001; Edmunds, Milton, & Wills, 2018; Edmunds
& Wills, 2016; M. Jones & Love, 2011; Kurtz, 2007; Verguts & Fias, 2009), and it is still
unclear how the mechanisms of rule generation and instance memorization interact and
whether they are exhaustive. Here we propose a novel framework of how people learn
cognitive representations of rules and how these dynamically interact with memory
processes. We call this model CAL, which stands for Category Abstraction Learning.
The question about which mechanisms underlie category learning also concerns
growing theoretical challenges, including how people learn to focus attention on relevant
information during classifications, how decision rules are extrapolated for unobserved
categories, or how task instructions affect category learning performance. For one of
these challenges, leading category-learning theories (for an overview see Pothos & Wills,
2011) generally assume that rule-like behavior can be described by mechanisms of
focusing attention on dimensions (e.g., to ’wings’) to predict stimulus outcomes. The
predominant formal way of implementing this mechanism is known as error-driven
attentional learning, as typified by the Attention Learning COVEring map (ALCOVE;
Kruschke, 1992) model, one of the most successful and popular models of category
learning. In ALCOVE, attention shifts away from features that produce erroneous
predictions during learning. However, empirical evidence is accumulating that casts
some doubt on the plausibility of error-driven attention learning.
In particular, first, the well-known idea of error-based correction (or optimal
attention learning; see also Mackintosh, 1975; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) has been
questioned in recent category-learning studies that use eye-tracking (arguably, if one
assumes that prediction error equals decision error) because overt attentional
reallocation between stimulus features continues even after categorization errors have
ceased (e.g., M. R. Blair, Watson, & Meier, 2009; Le Pelley, Mitchell, Beesley, George,
& Wills, 2016; Matsuka & Corter, 2008; Rehder & Hoffman, 2005a; see further below).
Second, one of the groundbreaking paradigms employs the Six Problem types
introduced by Shepard, Hovland, and Jenkins (1961; see also Kruschke, 1992; Nosofsky,
Gluck, Palmeri, McKinley, & Glauthier, 1994). It has been shown that several models,
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which rely on prediction error, can explain the overall pattern of learning behavior in
this paradigm. Intriguingly, however, the same models fail to explain behavior in this
paradigm when there are slight changes in task instructions (Kurtz, Levering, Stanton,
Romero, & Morris, 2013), or when the category structure is modified to allow
spontaneous rule extrapolation beyond observed instances (Conaway & Kurtz, 2017).
Indeed, after a century of research (Hull, 1920), category-learning behavior is still not
fully understood, and thus there is a need for new psychologically plausible perspectives
on the underlying cognitive processes.
The overarching goal of the current research is to provide a general cognitive
framework of category learning that resolves these and several other issues that we
highlight in the course of this article. Our goal is to precisely describe and explain a
broad range of learning phenomena while minimizing formal flexibility, guided by
psychologically-focused theories from different domains (Wills & Pothos, 2012). This
article is structured as follows. First, we detail the literature and outstanding issues
that motivated our research at the outset. Second, we present a brief overview of the
cognitive hypotheses built into CAL, introducing the constructs of stimulus
generalization, rule abstraction, attention learning, and executive control (of attention
and context-guided rule switching), providing an intuitive understanding of our
modeling hypotheses. In subsequent sections, we provide their theoretical and empirical
foundations as well as discussing related behavioral phenomena in category and
reinforcement learning. Third, we provide a formal description of CAL, followed by
model evaluations including simulations of behavior as well as attention measured with
eye-tracking in classic benchmark paradigms, that previously could not be explained
either alone or within a single model. Fourth and finally, we discuss some novel insights
concerning previous theories of category learning and some broader implications.
Theoretical Background
Much of what is known about category learning (in animals and humans) is
grounded in research on reinforcement learning and discrimination learning (for
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overviews, see e.g., Mackintosh, 1974; Sutton & Barto, 1998). For instance, in their
pioneering work on category learning (or supervised reinforcement learning), Shepard,
Hovland, and Jenkins (1961) provided a paradigm that became a benchmark for
category learning models. In their tasks, participants learned to categorize stimuli with
three binary features (e.g., color [black vs. white], shape [square vs. triangle], and size
[small vs. large]). They learned six category structures varying in difficulty (Problem
Types I-VI, Figure 1A). The primary result was that the learning curves (rate of
increase in accuracy) systematically differed between the problems, such that I > II >
[III, IV, V] > VI (see also Nosofsky, Gluck, Palmeri, McKinley, & Glauthier, 1994).
Figure 1 . (A) Classic category structures Type I-VI (Shepard et al., 1961).
Coordinates represent stimuli with three binary dimensions; black and white circles
indicate categories. (B) Coordinate grid of the incomplete Type II (Exclusive-Or)
structure as trained in Conaway and Kurtz (2017); ‘A’ and ‘B’ refer to categories of
trained stimuli. Shaded cells refer to the extrapolation area for category ’B’.
One successful approach to explaining the relatively quick learning in Types I and
II is to note that, in Type I, one dimension is sufficient to solve the task (separating
white and black circles in Figure 1A), two dimensions are sufficient in Type II, while all
three are relevant in each of the other problems, which has led to the idea of
attention-weighted stimulus processing (Nosofsky, 1986). Subsequently developed
category-learning models include corresponding mechanisms that learn to focus
attention on diagnostic dimensions to predict performance in the Six Problems, such as
ALCOVE (Kruschke, 1992).
ALCOVE stores decision instances as exemplars in memory, which then generalize
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via similarity to the presented stimulus, while also learning which dimensions should be
used to calculate similarity. Another popular approach is the Supervised and
Unsupervised STratified Adaptive Incremental Network (SUSTAIN; Love et al., 2004),
which, similar to the Bayesian rational model by Anderson (1991), assumes that
learning involves the formation of cluster representations in memory. In addition,
SUSTAIN (Love et al., 2004) involves an attention-learning mechanism that focuses on
predictive dimensions to keep the cluster complexity low, if possible. From this
perspective, the number of clusters required for successful learning varies between the
Six Problems, which relates to learning speed.
The empirical findings regarding performance in the Type II problem have recently
been extended. Kurtz et al. (2013) found that if the participants are specifically
instructed to seek rules then the classic findings hold. However, without rule
instructions, the Type II learning curve falls together with III, IV, and V, without
affecting the remaining pattern. Importantly, the overall decrease in Type II
performance in the absence of rule instructions appears to be an aggregate effect of a
bi-modal distribution of categorization accuracy. That is, without rule instructions
some participants perform worse on Type II than on Type IV, while other participants
perform better on Type II than on Type IV. As Kurtz et al. (2013) discuss, this is a
challenging phenomenon for all leading explanatory accounts of category learning.
In principle, ALCOVE (Kruschke, 1992) can predict this learning pattern in the
Type II task assuming that varying instructions induce differences in attention learning
within the population of learners. However, with such an assumption, ALCOVE would
also predict a bi-modal response distribution in Type I (see Kruschke, 1992, p. 28)
raising critical theoretical and empirical questions (see also M. R. Blair, Watson, &
Meier, 2009; M. R. Blair, Watson, Walshe, & Maj, 2009; Matsuka & Corter, 2008;
Rehder & Hoffman, 2005a). Kurtz et al. (2013) therefore suggest exploring alternative
accounts based on factors that interact with learning rule-like category representations
(see also Shepard, Hovland, and Jenkins, 1961).
Interestingly, pigeons and monkeys learn Type II problems more slowly than Type
CATEGORY ABSTRACTION LEARNING 9
IV problems (V. M. Navarro, Jani, & Wasserman, 2019; J. D. Smith, Minda, &
Washburn, 2004), suggesting that quick learning of Type II problems involves
higher-order cognitive processes lacking in non-human animals (see also Lea et al., 2009;
J. D. Smith, Coutinho, & Couchman, 2011). The question is, what this higher-order
process might be, if not attention learning. Indeed, the Type II task can be perfectly
solved by ‘restructuring’ the problem (i.e., breaking down a complex structure into
multiple simpler ones by knowledge partitioning; see also Kalish, Lewandowsky, &
Kruschke, 2004; Lewandowsky, Yang, Newell, & Kalish, 2012). Specifically, one can first
approach the Type II task assuming a single-dimensional rule (e.g. “black → category
B, and white → A”), and then applying this rule in specific contexts (e.g., for small
objects), while applying its inverse in other contexts (e.g., for large objects; see also
Little & Lewandowsky, 2009a, 2009b) — a process which we henceforth call contextual
modulation.
Approaching the Type II problem in this rule-like way will facilitate quick learning
of the task. Conversely, if people are not prompted by instructions to search for
categorization rules, they might approach the problem by memorizing each stimulus,
which might lead to slower learning. Thus, the diverse distributions of human learning
success in Type II may stem from participants relying on different cognitive processes to
master the task, with rule instructions motivating the learner to engage in processes
that trigger contextual modulation.
This idea is corroborated by a recent study, in which the Type II task, which can
also be described as an ‘Exclusive Or’ (XOR) problem, was extended to explicitly test
rule abstraction or ‘extrapolation’ behavior (Conaway & Kurtz, 2017). In this study,
participants were trained on a two-dimensional version of the problem (Figure 1B).
However, some stimuli were left untrained (empty cells in Figure 1B). Crucially, the
untrained stimuli were presented in a subsequent test phase, where about 31% and 45%
of the participants, in Exp. 1 and 2B, respectively, extrapolated ‘B’ for stimuli in the
lower right quadrant (shaded area in Figure 1B), while others responded ‘A’. The
response pattern of those participants who extrapolated ‘B’ corresponded to a complete
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Type II solution, which can be explained in terms of contextual modulation, while the
behavior of the other participants could be explained in terms of learning a rule and its
exceptions, or memorization and similarity-based generalization of the ‘A’ exemplars.
Despite the evident structural similarity between the classic Type II problem and
its incomplete variant, ALCOVE (Kruschke, 1992), by its definition as an
exemplar-similarity model, cannot predict this pattern of extrapolation. While other
models predict extrapolation in this task to some extent, such as the DIVergent
Autoencoder model (DIVA; Kurtz, 2007; see further Conaway & Kurtz, 2017), it seems
to be an open question whether there is an account that can simultaneously explain the
Conaway and Kurtz (2017) result, and the various Type I-VI results (see also Kurtz et
al., 2013; for further discussions). We argue that individual differences in rule learning
(leading to contextual modulation) and memorization might explain all these behavioral
patterns, as well as several further empirical phenomena that we will discuss later. In
the next section, we outline our new model, focusing on the main mechanisms and how
they can explain when and how rules emerge during category learning and how task
instructions might affect these processes.
Category Abstraction Learning
In this section, we introduce our general cognitive hypotheses to allow a basic
understanding of the later analyses without formal background. We then extend the
theoretical and formal definitions in more detail in the subsequent sections. The CAL
framework is comprised of three main theoretical strands of rule learning, attention
learning, and contextual modulation interacting with the fourth component of stimulus
memory, which we explain later. Figure 2 illustrates the core theory of how the first
three factors interact. Thus, CAL is a hybrid account of category learning and
according to the overview provided by Palmeri, Wong, and Gauthier (2004)
conceptually located somewhere between RULEX (Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley,
1994) and ATRIUM (Erickson & Kruschke, 1998). The main focus of our hypotheses
lies on the question of how people abstract category representations, in which the first
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noteworthy difference to the just cited models can be identified. That is, while RULEX
switches between rules stochastically, and ATRIUM learns to associate pre-defined rule
functions (with adjustable decision bounds), CAL is designed to abstract its rules based
on the following psychologically motivated learning functions.
Henceforth, we will use the term ‘simple rules’ to refer to a class of behavior, which
could (but need not) be verbalized into a decision criterion or hypothesis on a single
dimension such as “small objects belong to A, and large objects belong to B” (denoted
small → A, large → B), or “smaller objects are more likely to belong to A than to B”.
First, we suggest that the generation of simple rules can be explained by resolving a
formal distinction between similarity-driven category inference (e.g., Medin & Schaffer,
1978; Shepard, 1987) and dissimilarity-driven category inference (e.g. Ashby & Gott,
1988). More specifically, we propose that in addition to similarity-based generalization
there is a learning process called ‘contrasting’, which refers to an individual’s tendency
to abstract regularities for unobserved instances by their dissimilarity to (currently)
observed instances (e.g., “This feature predicts category A, hence, other dissimilar
features predict category B”).
Different from earlier exemplar-based approaches to dissimilarity (e.g., Hampton,
Estes, & Simmons, 2005; Little, Wang, & Nosofsky, 2016; Stewart & Brown, 2005;
Stewart, Brown, & Chater, 2002; Stewart & Morin, 2007), we assume that these
mechanisms happen during learning and on independent stimulus dimensions.
Consequently, we treat both similarity-like and rule-like behavioral strategies as a result
of two inversely related learning functions in one single process rather than being
qualitatively different processes (for a related discussion see Pothos, 2005; see also
Verguts & Fias, 2009).
We assume that instructions to learn categorization rules affect the degree of
contrasting by tightening the dis-similarity function illustrated in Figure 2 (1) Rule
Learning. The upper part illustrates the basic learning process for a stimulus with
‘Angle’ and ‘Length’ features. ‘B’ is the observed category (Feedback) and ‘A’ is the
unobserved one. The dotted lines reflect associative generalization, and the solid line on
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Figure 2 . CAL framework, in three steps of rule learning, contextual modulation
learning and attention learning. Please see text.
the ‘Length’ dimension illustrates contrasting which associates distant stimuli with
category ‘A’.
We further assume, that repeated updates during sequential learning adjust
existing beliefs in a self-confirmatory fashion (success-driven). That is, we assume that
feedback which confirms the prediction leads to stronger updates and that erroneous
predictions lead to attenuated updates to maintain previously learned rules (e.g., in
probabilistic environments; see also Craig, Lewandowsky, & Little, 2011). This process
thereby accumulates self-reinforcing category evidence along the feature continuum,
which can (but does not always) result in simple rules with clear category boundaries.
Second, we assume self-confirmatory (not error-driven) attention learning (see also
Love et al., 2004; Nosofsky, Gluck, et al., 1994) based on the idea that learned rules
(e.g., for ‘wings’) are evaluated by how well they predict desired outcomes (subjective
diagnosticity). This leads to focusing attention on the subjectively diagnostic feature
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dimension, as illustrated in Figure 2. We assume that this circularly reinforces learning
more about their rules in subsequent instances while ignoring non-diagnostic rule
dimensions, which seems in line with empirical evidence from eye-tracking studies (e.g.,
Matsuka & Corter, 2008; Rehder & Hoffman, 2005a). Thus, in contrast to the
widespread use of error-driven optimal-learning mechanisms, we argue that attention
learning is better explained by attraction to strongly associated (successfull) predictors
(see also Le Pelley et al., 2016).
For clarity, we do not dismiss the idea that learners react to errors, but do argue
that error detection does not necessarily induce representational correction of the rule
(for a related review in the domain of judgment and decision making see Risen, 2016).
We argue, that one first has to build an idea about successful predictors before one can
focus attention on them. This would also bias the learner to rely on first impressions,
which seems intuitively plausible.
Finally, in CAL, the interaction between rule- and attention-learning mechanisms
builds the fundamental basis upon which higher-order cognition operates, which we call
contextual modulation of simple rules, illustrated in Figure 2 (steps 2 & 3). We assume
that erroneous rules are modulated (e.g. inhibited) if their errors occur in specific
contexts (e.g., specific values on another stimulus dimension). That is, error correction
in CAL happens on a higher cognitive level. The purpose of contextual modulation is
similar to that of learning more complex rules in RULEX (Nosofsky, Palmeri, &
McKinley, 1994) if simple rules fail. However, the actual mechanism in CAL is
somewhat more similar to ATRIUM (Erickson & Kruschke, 1998) in that CAL detects
the contexts, in which the erroneous rule can be applied or not. We also assume that
registering a predictor of rule errors is more likely, if it is itself non-diagnostic of
responses/outcomes (e.g., the angle dimension, in Figure 2 step 1), viewing the
interaction between rule learning and contextual modulation as concerned with different
goals and competing attention mechanisms.
This motivates two novel assumptions about the cognitive processes of category
learning: (1) there is a second attention mechanism that tries to locate sources of rule
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errors (which requires higher-level cognitive control), and (2), that initial learning of a
rule is based on successful classifications, but that even if a successful rule subsequently
leads to (frequent) systematic errors it is not adjusted but left intact, with its execution
affected by the context (see also, Rahnev & Denison, 2018; Risen, 2016), which connects
the model to ideas of knowledge restructuring and partitioning (e.g., Erickson &
Kruschke, 1998; Kalish et al., 2004; Kruschke, 2003). Figure 2 (steps 2 & 3) illustrates
this process, where the rule dimension (‘Length’ short → A, long → B) only correctly
predicts the outcomes when the stimulus is vertical, but not when it is horizontal, which
will lead to paying attention to the ‘Angle’ dimension, not for predicting outcomes, but
for predicting errors. However, we took inspiration from RULEX (Nosofsky, Palmeri, &
McKinley, 1994) by also considering situations in which CAL actively decides to quit
from such complex rules, a feature of CAL which we explain in the Formal Description.
In the following four subsections, we first outline the shared aspects of animal
reinforcement and human category learning that point to the unification of the inference
processes of similarity and dissimilarity (contrasting) into one common mechanism.
Second, we explain how the assumed mental rule-like representations that result from
this process might drive attention learning, and how this might lead to decision biases
(learning overly simplistic rules). Third, we draw the connection from the first two
simple learning processes to those of higher-order error detection, which not only (can)
guard against decision biases (which, in CAL, come from adhering to learned rules in
the wrong situations), but more importantly, also lead to solving complex decision
problems (such as Type II) efficiently. Fourth, and finally, we explain how, in CAL,
stimulus memorization contributes to category inference as a last resort if everything
else fails (basically, conceiving stimulus memorization as a memory for exceptions)
unless CAL directly engages a memorization strategy.
Generalization and Contrasting
In animal-learning studies, pigeons learn to repeat their actions (e.g. pecking) for
specific stimuli (e.g. wavelength of a tone) if they get food for it (reinforcement).
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Interestingly, if stimuli are presented that are similar to the previous one, then pigeons
repeat their responses for those as well, but less frequently with decreasing similarity.
The same type of stimulus generalization can be observed in studies of human
reinforcement learning (Mackintosh, 1974; Sutton & Barto, 1998). This includes
learning which situations are rewarding or punishing (reward learning) and supervised
learning such as category learning (CL), in which reinforcement is typically trial-specific
accuracy feedback designed to teach the selection of different responses (category labels)
contingent on presented stimulus characteristics (e.g., color, size, acoustics). The
overarching behavioral observation that stimulus responses are driven by similarity to
trained instances inspired the law of stimulus generalization (Shepard, 1987), one of the
most influential theories in the area of cognition, inspiring research across a wide range
of domains, such as working memory (e.g., Brown, Neath, & Chater, 2007; Oberauer &
Lin, 2017), machine learning (see Jäkel, Schölkopf, & Wichmann, 2008a), and category
learning (see Pothos & Wills, 2011).
In CL, the principle of stimulus generalization (Shepard, 1987) underlies several
theoretical accounts of category inference. Perhaps most prominently, the theoretical
framework of context theory (e.g., the generalized context model, GCM; Medin &
Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986) builds on stimulus generalization by assuming that the
presentation of a stimulus activates stored category exemplars in memory with
activation decaying with psychological distance to the presented stimulus. The
gradually activated exemplars and their associated categories are then integrated into
overall category activation (see Figure 3), an assumption taken up in ALCOVE
(Kruschke, 1992; see also Kruschke, 2005). Instead of exemplars, similarity has also been
theorized to be evaluated based on comparison to abstract category prototypes (e.g.,
Medin, Altom, & Murphy, 1984; Reed, 1972; J. D. Smith & Minda, 1998), perceptrons
(e.g., Goldstone, Steyvers, & Larimer, 1996), or category clusters (see Love et al., 2004;
D. J. Navarro & Griffiths, 2008), showcasing the pervasiveness of similarity-based
learning mechanisms (see also Hahn, 2014; for function learning perspectives see
DeLosh, Busemeyer, & McDaniel, 1997; Lucas, Griffiths, Williams, & Kalish, 2015).







































Figure 3 . Category inference (A versus B) as formalized in exemplar theories.
Exemplars are activated based on similarity to the stimulus (darker = more similar;
arrow thickness indicates category activation). See text.
However, despite the appeal and broad success of these models, similarity-based
generalization cannot explain its simple but intriguing counterpart in animal and
human learning — behavioral contrast (see Mackintosh, 1974; Reynolds, 1961; Zentall,
2005). That is, if a stimulus is first reinforced (e.g. by food), but the reinforcement is
later omitted (i.e., in an extinction phase), then pigeons respond relatively strongly to
stimuli that are dissimilar to the extinguished stimulus (pecking more frequently
compared to a control condition). In other words, pigeons seemingly extrapolate the
presence of food for stimuli dissimilar to the extinguished one.
Contrast-like effects can also be observed in children (e.g., Landau, Smith, &
Jones, 1988; Markman & Wachtel, 1988; see also Kersten, Goldstone, & Schaffert,
1998), and there is evidence for dissimilarity-based processes in adult CL (e.g.
Austerweil, Liew, Conaway, & Kurtz, 2019; Hampton et al., 2005; Little et al., 2016;
Stewart & Brown, 2005; Stewart & Morin, 2007). These dissimilarity-based processes
are sometimes considered to operate on exemplar representations, as in the just-cited
papers, and sometimes considered to be an inherent component of rule-based models
(see also Davis & Love, 2010). That is, rule-based models often use dissimilarity to a
reference point to draw inferences about a stimulus’s category; the corresponding
CATEGORY ABSTRACTION LEARNING 17
psychological representation of the latter is traditionally described as a decision bound
(e.g., Ashby & Gott, 1988; Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Reed, 1972).
We propose that combining learning functions of similarity and dissimilarity in one
learning mechanism can explain how both similarity-like and rule-like behavior develops
during learning. This approach not only allows us to address the question of how and
why rule instructions might alter category and reinforcement learning behavior, but it
also unifies seemingly long-standing opposing accounts (see also Hahn & Chater, 1998;































































Figure 4 . Rule-learning via similarity and contrast on two abstracted dimensions. (A)
Line stimulus (S, orange) with angle and length feature dimensions; feedback is
’category A’. (B) Similarity (solid line) and Contrast (dashed) updates illustrated for
the associative strengths between the length dimension nodes and the categories
(present A and absent B, respectively). (C) Resulting evidence ratio further used for
category predictions. Bars correspond to histogram for length dimension in (D), which
illustrates an activation map (darker shading predicts ’category B’) when summing the
predictions of both dimensions. (E) and (F) illustrate two subsequent trials with two
category ’A’ stimuli, and resulting uni-dimensional rule-like representations.
Figure 4 exemplifies rule learning in CAL for a line stimulus that can be assigned
to one of two categories ‘A’ and ‘B’ based on two dimensions angle and length. First,
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we assume that each feature dimension (e.g., length in Figure 4A) is represented
independently from other dimensions (see also Love et al., 2004), in line with theories
assuming that input features are first processed separately (e.g. Treisman, 1998; Wills,
Inkster, & Milton, 2015). These dimensions have single units ordered by the magnitude
they represent, inspired by the concept of elemental stimulus representations (see
Harris, 2006; McLaren & Mackintosh, 2002), the associative learning model (ALM;
DeLosh et al., 1997), as well as theories assuming that mental representations about
any quality (e.g., time, size, brightness) are spatially organized within the region of
direct access in working memory to bind new information into a common relational
structure (see further Oberauer, 2009, p. 52 f.; see also Morton, Sherrill, & Preston,
2017). Note that CAL makes no predictions about conscious deliberation about these
rule dimensions; such processes are neither required nor excluded in CAL’s current
formulation. While we would assume that encoding integral stimuli in this format
should be more difficult, we focus on the case of separable dimensions and discuss the
corresponding implications in the simulation sections.
Stimulus generalization (Shepard, 1987) accumulates evidence for the currently
observed category and contrasting abstracts evidence for the currently absent categories
(‘Contrast’ in Figure 4B). Three aspects of this approach are noteworthy. First, we
assume that this kind of category abstraction happens during learning, but not during
retrieval. Second, contrasting is somewhat akin to the idea of integrative encoding
(Shohamy & Wagner, 2008), with the more general claim that associations can be
created between ‘imagined’ features which either are expected or are simply abstract in
general. And third, during subsequent inferences, every single unit on a dimension can
be queried (without noise) to evaluate the amount of accumulated evidence for or
against a category on that dimension (as evidence ratio in Figure 4C), similar to
Bayesian hypothesis testing (e.g., Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001; see also Dayan & Daw,
2008; Kording, 2014). The interplay between both generalization and contrasting,
thereby, builds a continuum (see also Pothos, 2005) of possible inferences for observed
and unobserved events (see Figure 4D-F), including behavioral contrast, and what could
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be called a category boundary (e.g., between nodes 3 and 4 in Figure 4B or F).
Feature Attention
Attention shifts to those components of a stimulus that most reliably predict the
learned or desired outcomes (see Le Pelley et al., 2016). This reliable observation in
category and reinforcement learning has to be accounted for by every learning model.
One consequence related to this phenomenon is an increase in the speed of learning
about the predictor-outcome regularities of the focused dimension (see also L. B. Smith,
Colunga, & Yoshida, 2010), which provides one potential avenue to explain the quick
Type I and Type II learning first observed by Shepard et al. (1961), and related
phenomena (e.g., latent inhibition, conditioned blocking, intra- and extra-dimensional
attention shifts, filtration, and condensation; see further Kruschke, 2001; Lubow &
Gewirtz, 1995; Mackintosh, 1974, 1975; Oades, 1997; Oades & Sartory, 1997).
Perhaps the most commonly implemented formal mechanism to explain attention
shifts is that of optimal attention learning via gradient descent on prediction error (see
Holland & Schiffino, 2016; Kruschke, 1992, 2003; Le Pelley et al., 2016; Pothos & Wills,
2011), which (formally) reduces attention to dimensions if they produce more errors
(the actual outcome differs from the expected outcome) than other dimensions.
Interestingly, however, in their eye-tracking study Rehder & Hoffman (2005a; including
problem types I, II, IV, and VI; see also M. R. Blair, Watson, & Meier, 2009;
M. R. Blair, Watson, Walshe, & Maj, 2009; Matsuka & Corter, 2008; Wasserman, Teng,
& Castro, 2014) showed that attention settles on predictive (or informative) features
only after categorization errors disappeared. In their strongest interpretation (assuming
equivalence of prediction error and decision error), optimal attention learning, as
defined in established accounts (see further Pothos & Wills, 2011), would predict the
opposite, namely, that attention shifts before errors disappear (i.e., to correct the
representation that caused it), such that learning stops without errors.
Although error-driven attention learning can predict the classic ordinal pattern of
performance in the classic Six Problems (Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994; Shepard
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et al., 1961), the actual process-level data (eye-tracking) reveal open questions
regarding its psychological interpretation (see also Risen, 2016). This seems also to be
the case for models that would assume hypothesis sampling which is not evident in
overt attention shifts during learning (for discussions see Matsuka & Corter, 2008;
Rehder & Hoffman, 2005a), rather in line with early theories about hypothesis reduction
(e.g., Levine, 1966), or “filtration” (e.g., Gottwald & Garner, 1975; Posner, 1964).
As an alternative, we assume that attention follows diagnostic simple rules (see
also, Tversky, 1977, p. 342). For this, CAL screens the existing dimension-outcome
associations for the variance in their predictions and then adjusts its rule-specific focus
of attention, which will affect both learning and inference. This idea draws inspiration
from the previously proposed concept of dimensionalized adaptive learning rates
(DALR; Gluck, Glauthier, & Sutton, 1992; Jacobs, 1988; Nosofsky, Gluck, et al., 1994).
We consequently assume that the impact of a learning update of predictor-outcome
associations (∆wk in Figure 4B) is proportional to a dimension’s (subjective)
diagnosticity, such that focused attention further accelerates the emergence of sharp
category boundaries on a dimension (e.g., Goldstone, 1994; see further Formal
Description of CAL). Furthermore, we assume that focusing on one dimension reduces
the ability to learn about other predictors.
Our working definition of dimension diagnosticity corresponds to existing concepts
of rule-boundary models (e.g., Ashby & Gott, 1988; Bröder, Newell, & Platzer, 2010;
Juslin, Jones, Olsson, & Winman, 2003) and their close formal relation to regression
models. Specifically, we assume that the variance in category predictions over a
dimension is proportional to how informative this dimension is perceived to be (e.g.,
line length co-varies with different categories indicated by the evidence ratios in
Figure 4C), relative to other dimensions (e.g., subjective utility; see also Orquin &
Loose, 2013). However, the diagnosticity of a dimension does not necessarily imply a
monotonic relation between dimension values and outcomes; nominal relations are also
possible (for further details, see the Formal Description of CAL).
In sum, stimulus dimensions (e.g., color and shape) receive more attention in CAL
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if they are subjectively diagnostic compared to others, and learning about
non-diagnostic dimensions eventually ceases unless the more diagnostic dimensions
become erroneous again. This can lead to persistent choice biases (objective decision
errors) if initially observed instances did not represent the true state in the outside
world. However, if simple-rule errors occur systematically (context dependent), CAL
triggers a further mechanism of higher order, which we call contextual modulation.
Contextual Modulation and Representational Attention
By contextual modulation, we broadly refer to the ability, hypothesized in CAL, to
(1) to detect situations (contexts) in which its simple rules lead to systematic errors, (2)
focus attention on the error-predicting context cues, and (3) inhibit the simple rules
before re-mapping them to other responses (modulation). Our theoretical assumptions
about the nature of these processes were inspired by research from multiple domains.
First, in reinforcement learning, animals and humans show increased attention to
the context if a conditioned response is extinguished, as well as a recovery of the
conditioned response if the extinction context is removed (e.g., Alvarado, Jara, Vila, &
Rosas, 2006; Battaglia, Garofalo, & di Pellegrino, 2018; Cobos, González-Martín,
Varona-Moya, & López, 2013; Lucke, Lachnit, Koenig, & Uengoer, 2013; Nelson,
Lamoureux, & León, 2013). From this perspective, context refers to a noticeable change
during extinction, such as a newly presented stimulus, the environment itself but also
temporal dynamics (see further Bouton, 1993; Rosas, Todd, & Bouton, 2013).
Second, a very similar type of behavioral adaptation can be observed in CL, when
categories of stimuli change between contexts, which is usually studied in reference to
knowledge partitioning or restructuring (George & Kruschke, 2012; Sewell &
Lewandowsky, 2011, 2012; Yang & Lewandowsky, 2003, 2004). While some researchers
have proposed that people switch between different modules (rules vs. exemplars as in
ATRIUM; e.g., Erickson & Kruschke, 1998), we argue that decision makers switch
between different rules (similar to RULEX; Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994), or
task goals (e.g., Ballard, Kit, Rothkopf, & Sullivan, 2013; Morton et al., 2017), similarly
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hypothesized in function learning (Kalish et al., 2004) and visual search (Conci, Sun, &
Müller, 2011), and that systematic rule errors trigger this mechanism.
For example, under our account, a decision-maker could learn the simple rule
“large → A, and small → B” and subsequently notices that it only applies if the shape
of the stimulus took the value “square”, but not for “circles”. Then the rule and its
opposite “small → A, and large → B” can be applied on the basis of the context,
similar to partially remapping the rule to different responses (e.g., Kruschke, 1996;
Wills, Noury, Moberly, & Newport, 2006). Hence, in addition to feature attention
directed at predictors of responses, we propose a second attention mechanism, similar to
previous discussions on representational attention (e.g., Lewandowsky, 2011; Sewell &
Lewandowsky, 2012; see also George & Kruschke, 2012; Johansen & Palmeri, 2002), but
concerned with attending to predictors of rule errors.
Third, contextual modulation might be closely related to executive functions (or
attentional control) in working memory (WM; e.g., Miyake & Friedman, 2012; Miyake
& Shah, 1999), which concerns “domain-general processes that keep stimulus and goal
representations accessible under conditions of interference, distraction, and response
competition” (Kane et al., 2006, p. 750), or “ongoing mental operations and actions,
selectively activating relevant representations and processes and inhibiting irrelevant
ones” (Oberauer, Süß, Schulze, Wilhelm, & Wittmann, 2000; p. 1019). That is, the two
targets of attention (simple rules and context cues that predict their errors) not only
imply an ability of cognitive control to mediate between two different goals (rule
learning versus inhibiting the execution of rules) but a strategic interplay. That is, we
assume that a diagnostic rule is not considered as a modulator during learning, and vice
versa, splitting up attention to different stimulus features for different purposes (see
further Formal Description of CAL).
Contextual modulation challenges common conceptions of error-driven learning in
two ways. First, it becomes obvious that simple rules have to be maintained instead of
being forgotten or corrected when they produce errors in some contexts, otherwise, any
error-driven adjustment of simple rules would hinder using this rule in other contexts.
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In this vein, when viewing the process of context-dependent rule switching through the
formal lens of picking a candidate function from a pre-defined pool (e.g., Erickson &
Kruschke, 1998; Kalish et al., 2004), it can be easily overlooked that learning simple
rules from experience requires the rule representation to be stable, even when confronted
with prediction errors. Thus, we assume that contextual modulation contributes to
neglecting the errors of simple rules during learning (error discounting; see also Craig et
al., 2011), which has rule-confirmation bias as a natural outcome. Second, rule learning
in CAL is defined as success-driven, while learning from prediction error is defined as a
(strategic) search for sources of errors, which also might differentiate human from
animal learning in terms of executive functions (e.g. Lea et al., 2009).
In summary, besides rule-error discounting, contextual modulation involves
cognitive mechanisms that can (a) register the contexts in which systematic errors
occurred (error detection), and (b) focus attention to the cues that predict rule errors in
future decisions (for behavioral adjustment). Thus, we view modulator (or
representational) attention as concerned with attributing errors to external factors, and
with creating conditional hypotheses for using simple rules.
Configural Memory
As a last resort, CAL creates associations between instance representations and
responses in configural memory if rules have non-systematic exceptions. More
specifically, the default in CAL is to strongly encode stimulus associations into memory
only if its rules fail to predict the categories correctly. However, CAL can also
strategically engage in memorization which we further discuss in the formal description
of configural memory. Our assumptions about learning exceptions (from rules and
modulation) were again motivated from multiple theoretical perspectives.
Most importantly, although category inference based on exemplar-similarity is
among the most popular and successful theories of CL (e.g., Nosofsky, 1992), the formal
assumptions of exemplar models (e.g., the generalized context model; Medin & Schaffer,
1978; Nosofsky, 1986) stand in contrast to observed behavioral patterns in several
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studies. For instance, exemplar models (see also Dougherty, Gettys, & Ogden, 1999) are
global matching algorithms that formally require the existence of all observed instances
in memory, sometimes also under the strong theoretical interpretation “that categories
are represented psychologically as collections of individually stored exemplars”
(Nosofsky, 1988; p. 413; but see Medin, Dewey, & Murphy, 1983, for an alternative
interpretation). Although there are further aspects of feature weighting that would
influence this interpretation (e.g., Nosofsky, 1986), the formal set up of exemplar
models seems not entirely supported by empirical evidence showing that storing single
exemplars in memory depends on whether encountered stimuli were unexpected, or
atypical, compared to the majority of stimuli in the same category (e.g., as exceptions
from rules; M. R. Blair & Homa, 2001; Cook & Smith, 2006; Davis, Love, & Preston,
2012; Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Homa, Blair, McClure, Medema, & Stone, 2019;
Palmeri & Nosofsky, 1995; Sakamoto & Love, 2004; Shohamy, Myers, Onlaor, & Gluck,
2004; see also Squire, 1992; Squire & Knowlton, 1995).
In line with this evidence, and with previous models of rule learning (e.g., RULEX
Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994), we assume that encoding of configural
representations is enhanced for rule exceptions and retrieving those instances
temporarily suspends the rule prediction, akin to a top-down intervention.
Consequently, we assume that strongly associated exemplars (signaling their exceptional
status) generalize less strongly to novel stimuli, or, in case of shifting to a memorization
strategy, enforce stimulus identification not generalization (or interference; for a related
discussion see Medin & Schaffer, 1978; , p. 232). Thus, we acknowledge that humans
can encode long-lasting memory representations of single instances in memory, but we
assume that these representations are separate from abstracted similarity-based rule
representations (see also Erickson & Kruschke, 1998).
Conceptually, we view stimulus memorization as demanding cognitive resources to
bind (all) separately perceived stimulus features into one representation (Treisman,
1998; Unsworth, 2019). In category learning, similar views are referred to as
‘Combination Theory’, which conceives configural memories as a result of more complex
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brain processes, relative to learning simple rules which we view as dominant route (see
Lamberts, 1995; Wills, Ellett, Milton, Croft, & Beesley, 2020; Wills et al., 2015).
Consequently, similar but not identical to the error-based formation of clusters in
SUSTAIN (Love et al., 2004) or exception learning in RULEX (Nosofsky, Palmeri, &
McKinley, 1994), we assume that prediction errors of CAL’s rules (i.e., if modulation
fails) lead to feature combination beyond contextual modulation. Otherwise, the
memory update is weak, as further detailed in the formal description.
Formal Description of CAL
In the formal description, we first explain how CAL predicts categories by
outlining CAL’s network layout (see Figure 5) and then describe the formal learning
processes. 1 For a brief overview, the layout in Figure 5 shows that CAL is logically
divided into two systems, the Rule Network (separate rule dimensions interacting with
each other via contextual modulation) and Configural Memory (stored stimuli). The
systems influence each other during learning and inference, which we explain below.
Each of the following sections (i.e., Category predictions and Learning) are
correspondingly structured into mechanisms concerning (a) rule representations on
independent dimensions, (b) contextual modulation and attention, and (c) configural
memory. We explain the use of three modifiable parameters governing the strength of
generalization and abstraction (i.e., similarity and contrast; as illustrated in Figure 4),
contextual modulation (attention control), and memory (strength of encoding).
Although CAL applies to any number of categories, for ease of exposition the following
formal description uses examples for the two-category special case, which is sufficient for
the simulations that follow.
1 A table of all central parameters, variables and learning functions can be found in the online
supplement on OSF, together with a short formal version listing the mathematical equations.
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Figure 5 . Schematic of CAL. (Rule Network) The stimulus S activates connections
(solid lines) between nodes on separate stimulus dimensions (e.g., angle 4, of 1–5) and o
outcomes (lower boxes A and B), which integrate into simple rule predictions (evidence
ratios; e.g., angle r1Io based on the active input I = 4 [orange] on the angle dimension
m = 1). The prediction can be re-gated to another category response z1Ik (upper boxes
A and B) by the modulator from the second (length) dimension (e.g, v12Jok = modulator
n = 2 for dimension m = 1). (Configural Memory) The stimulus also activates
instances in configural memory. The stronger their associative strength (shading) the
narrower their generalization, when integrated into memory-based evidence Hk.
Category predictions
Rule predictions. In the rule network, CAL integrates stimulus information in
psychological space defined by sets of nodes on separate dimensions (bottom squares in
Figure 5) ordered by the magnitude they represent (e.g., angle and length). Each node i
(numbers in squares) on a dimension m is associated to its own set of outcome nodes o
(squares A and B) with strength wmio (initialized to 1/(M + 1), M = number of
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dimensions).2 The current stimulus (orange nodes for angle 4 and length 2 in Figure 5)
activates each outcome node corresponding to their associative strengths. On each
dimension m, the evidence ratios of the activated node [I]-to-outcome[o] associations
yield dimension-specific rule predictions rmIo, calculated as log ’posterior odds’ for a





o wmI(o6=O) + .1
)
(1)
A normalization constant of .1 avoids strong evidence from weak weights. A value
of rmIO = 0 indicates equal associative strengths, rmIO > 0 predicts outcome O, and
rmIO < 1 reflects evidence against O.
Contextual modulation. A dimension’s rule prediction for outcome o can be
inhibited and re-mapped to another response (k) by re-gating rmIo to the response
nodes zmIk via modulator nodes vmnjok (the gray boxes behind dimension nodes in
Figure 5) on their active nodes J (orange lines). The j gating nodes of a modulator
dimension n register the accuracy of the simple rule predictions (except if coming from






rmIo · 1/(1 + exp(−vmnJok)) (2)
The modulator nodes vmnjok are initialized with .5 for matching and -.5 for
mismatching outcome-response associations. They later can take values between 5 and
-5 (see Equation 13). The parameter αm indicates the subjective diagnosticity of the
dimension m (i.e., feature attention), initialized to 1/M (sum to 1). If there is currently
no modulation process active (see Rule Switching) then gating is omitted
(zmI(k=o) = rmIo), and if a single dimension-modulator combination is rejected (e.g., for
m = 1, n = 2), then it it is excluded from the sum.
Configural memory. The presence of the stimulus S also activates configural
instance representations y via distance dy. Each instance y in memory is associated
2 Throughout this manuscript, a lowercase subscript (e.g. i) denotes the set of possible values of that
index, while an uppercase subscript (e.g. I) denotes a specific value within that set, usually the
selected or active unit.
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Figure 6 . Illustration of recall from memory in CAL on a single dimension m (x-axes)
with two stored instances (y1 → A and y2 → B) according to Equations 4–7. Lines
reflect associative strength to respective categories. If instance y2 increases in memory
strength (left to right graph) then generalization of category ‘B’ narrows. The vertical
line represents the point of indifference during the prediction. The gray area highlights
the stimulus space, in which the category of y1 is favored, otherwise that of y2.
with the category labels k with strengths hyk (initialized to 0). However, in CAL the
distance dy is calculated on a normalized scale. Specifically, the physical values (xmi) on





The minimum and maximum values are defined by the context of the experiment
(e.g., shading [black, dark gray, gray, light gray, white] is re-coded to the vector of [0,
.25, .5, .75, 1]).3 This method reduces parameter ambiguity (see Wills & Pothos, 2012)
by decoupling the measurement scale (e.g., the physical appearance of a stimulus
dimension) and changes of the similarity gradients introduced later (i.e., γ), and allows
to non-arbitrarily compare CAL’s parameter estimates across varying stimulus designs.
The normalized values are used to compute the sum of distances between the







3 An individual’s effective minimum and maximum values might also depend on previous experience;
for reasons of simplicity, the current version of CAL does not capture this.
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Figure 6 illustrates the influence of associative strength via narrowing
generalization in memory-based integration (strong associations hyk signal exception
status or a memorization/identification strategy). First, the total associative strength
hyk of each instance y is transformed.




The values of .5 and .25 are scaling constants. The exponential transform defines
cy as a similarity weight used as Gaussian gradient (see also Jäkel et al., 2008a; Jäkel,











· (.1 + hyk) (6)
Gaussian (rather than exponential) decay is chosen for consistency with the
subsequent rule-learning functions. The normalization constant of .1 added to hyk
avoids by-zero division (in case of zero associations) as well as very strong evidence
ratios for weak associative weights in the subsequent equations.4 The memory-based
prediction HK for a specific response K is then calculated in the same manner as rmIo,








Taken together, the prediction is a statistically stable solution of a probabilistic
selection, similar to the idea of an exemplar-based random walk (Nosofsky & Palmeri,
1997). Increasing associative strength, however, not only increases the strength of the
prediction but also localizes an instance’s influential space (see also Thompson, 1958,
1959).
4 We also considered deterministic selection of the strongest activated instance. However, the pattern
of results were the same in almost all simulations, besides different scaling of parameters. Our intuition
is that, across a broader range of simulations, the version reported in the current manuscript is likely to
be more adequate, but accept this is a matter for future research.
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Category probabilities. Finally, the probability of choosing category k is
calculated by summing the memory prediction Hk, and the rule predictions R
′
k, passed
to a logistic5 response rule:
p(k|S) =
1
1 + exp(−2.5 · [Hk + R′k])
(8)
We assume that both systems are always active (see Brumby & Hahn, 2017; Hahn,
Prat-Sala, Pothos, & Brumby, 2010; Lacroix, Giguere, & Larochelle, 2005; ; but see
next Equation). Including normalization constants (among others) prevents these
predictions to become 0 or 1. For still being able to provide strong predictions, we
included a scaling constant of 2.5 (for a critical discussion on using freely adjustable
response scaling see Krefeld-Schwalb, Scheibehenne, & Pachur, 2019). The rule







Dividing the summed rule predictions by the maximum memory-based evidence
(among all categories) represents an automatic memory-based intervention (e.g., with
generally strong encoding, or when strong exceptions are retrieved), with the side-effect
of better scaling of both modules’ predictions. However, in the case of probabilistic
feedback memory strength is non-informative of exception memory. Thus, if CAL
notices that an instance is associated to multiple categories in memory, the division by
the memory evidence is removed, which merits further investigation.
Rule switching. Similar to previous rule models (e.g., RULEX; Nosofsky,
Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994), CAL automatically switches between learning of simple
rules and modulated rules (plus their exceptions), depending on their success or errors,
respectively. The default mode is the latter, in which the above formulas apply. CAL,
quits modulation when a simple rule seems sufficiently accurate according to the
threshold θ (set to .85), then zmI(k=o) = rmIo in Equation 2. Before predicting the
current trial, CAL calculates rule accuracy taking the 5-trials-back average prediction
5 The definition of this response rule is a simplification that suffices for the experiments modeled here;
for alternative implementations see Wills, Reimers, Stewart, Suret, and McLaren (2000).
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on each dimension (i.e., 1/(1 + exp(αmrmIP )); P = correct category). If one of these
rules’ accuracy exceeds θ then response gating is omitted until accuracy becomes lower
again. The values of 5 trials and θ are arbitrary and both parameters could vary freely,
or even change over learning, but sufficed for the simulations that follow (for a similar
method see Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994). However, note that the strength of
rule learning will indirectly affect when these criteria are met.
CAL also omits single modulators in Equation 2 when they repeatedly lead to
strong prediction errors. Therefore, CAL evaluates modulation errors in the given trial
(i.e., after feedback: 1 − 1/(1 + exp(
∑
m zmIP ))). If the error is larger than θ, CAL
registers the currently most diagnostic dimension among the simple rules, with
max(αm), and the most diagnostic modulator, with max(βn(n6=m)), and counts the error
for this combination. If a count exceeds a further threshold, CAL omits the
corresponding combination during gating in Equation 2. Furthermore, βn for a
modulator is set to 0 in the beginning of each trial, in which the most diagnostic
dimension is part of the rejected dimension-modulator combination.
This tolerance threshold, again, is arbitrary, but we assume that it depends on the
complexity of the category structure defined as the product of the number of categories
and the number of dimensions M · C, which was sufficient in all simulations. We seek to
address these tentative assumptions and their potential constraints empirically in future
studies. However, we will briefly discuss their role and open questions in the sections
‘Contextual Modulation in Linear and Non-Linear Category Structures’ and ‘Rules and
Exceptions in the 5-4 Problem’.
Learning
Rule learning. Upon feedback (e.g., “This [long, vertical] line is an ‘A’.”), CAL
associates the nodes on the feature dimensions, separately for each dimension m, to the
outcome nodes (o = A and o = B in Figure 5). That is, the feedback ‘A’ is not only
interpreted as evidence for the presence of ‘A’ but also as absence of ‘B’. We henceforth
refer to the present (observed) category as P , and to the absent (unobserved) category
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as P̄ . The associations to category P are updated via excitatory generalization
(similarity), and those to P̄ are updated via contrasting (dissimilarity). Their general
magnitude can vary across the different dimensions through the presence of Ωm, which
we explain after describing each update.
Excitatory generalization. The associations of the dimension nodes to
category P (wmiP ) are updated in a Hebbian fashion (Hebb, 1949) by adding ∆wmiP ,
which is defined by a Gaussian decay of activation (see Appendix A for a discussion on
Exponential versus Gaussian gradients), maximal at input node I on a dimension m,
and symmetrically decreasing in strength with increasing (normalized) distance to it.
Formally,















The width of Gaussian decay is governed by the free parameter γ, which is identically
used (and scaled) in the following two functions below. Large positive values flatten the
generalization decay, discriminating less strongly between similar and dissimilar stimuli.
In CAL, excitatory generalization is self-confirmatory, i.e. reinforces prior
expectations (see also Berndsen, van der Pligt, Spears, & McGarty, 1996; Heit, 1997;
Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001; Zhu, Sanborn, & Chater, 2018). Therefore, the update on
each node is weighted by the ratio of its existing associations (wmio), which reduces the
update for nodes that only weakly predict P (i.e., discounting of unsystematic errors).
Contrasting. The inverse generalization update ∆wmiP̄ forms associations
between the dimension nodes and the absent category, such that future stimuli




















The contrasting update is stronger on dimension nodes that predicted the absent
category (i.e., the same prior weight as in Equation 10, but inverted). Adding 1 to this
exponential ensures that contrasting is less dependent on prior predictions (weaker error
discounting), such that hypothesis generation rather than observation (generalization)
changes existing outcome expectations. Generally, the belief-updating mechanism leads
to enhancing category boundaries quickly as soon as rules develop.
CATEGORY ABSTRACTION LEARNING 33
Each update is weighted by Ωm, which defines our hypotheses about purposeful
encoding of each dimension. Formally,







The modulator diagnosticity βn (here with n = m) informs whether a dimension is
currently used as modulator (e.g., β1 = 1). Thus, a dimension’s update is reduced
during simple-rule learning if it already predicts modulation of other rules. Including
αm reflects the hypothesis that generalization and contrasting on a dimension m depend
on the attention paid to it (subjective diagnosticity). The exponential term leads to
error discounting if rule errors always repeat in the same context(s), taking the gating
node that links the outcome-response association for category P . It reduces a
dimension’s update if vmnJP P < 0 (active re-mapping) and enhances it if vmnJP P > 0.
Weighting vmnJP P with αm and βn reduces effective error discounting for non-diagnostic
rule(s) and from non-diagnostic modulator(s). When CAL quits modulation to apply a
simple rule, then Ωm = αm.
Re-normalization. Importantly, after adding each update to the old dimension
associations, they are re-normalized by dividing them by the maximum value of that




mio + ∆wmio). This means the
associative strengths range between 0 and 1. However, we capped the range at .999 and
.001, mainly to allow CAL to learn nothing when the generalization gradient γ becomes
very broad, otherwise, CAL would always learn rules. The re-normalization has three
further effects. First, it prevents infinite growth of associative strengths and maintains
the plasticity of the basic rule learning process. Second, it applies lateral inhibition
(strong associations inhibit weaker ones). Similar concepts of lateral inhibition have
been implemented in several other models (e.g., Bhatia & Pleskac, 2019; Roe,
Busemeyer, & Townsend, 2001; Wills et al., 2000).
Third, at least one association per category on each dimension always has a
maximum of .999. For instance, if the same stimulus ‘S → A’ is presented repeatedly,
its association to category ‘A’ does not increase. Due to contrasting, however, its
association to alternative categories decreases, thereby increasing the certainty (and
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Figure 7 . Illustration of simple rule learning in CAL on a single dimension m (x-axes)
for three consecutive trials (lines) each with stimulus S → category A. (Top) Weighted
generalization and contrasting updates according to Equations 10 and 11 with γ = −1.
(Bottom) Resulting outcome associations wmio after re-normalization.
response strength) for ‘A’ when S is present. This implementation reflects the idea that
certainty includes learning that alternative outcomes were not missing at random (see
also Meder, Mayrhofer, & Waldmann, 2014). Figure 7 illustrates this mechanism over
three consecutive trials, also showing that generalization narrows the consequential
region with training (see also Shepard & Kannappan, 1991) and contrasting broadens
the contrastive consequential region away from S, similar to what has been called
idealization by contrast (see Davis & Love, 2010).
Figure 8 further illustrates how changes in γ result in rather probabilistic or
deterministic single-dimension rules. For each, we applied CAL once to the same
sequence of 13 trials. In each trial, we presented one stimulus randomly drawn from the
whole range (category A [stimuli 1 to 4], B [5 to 9]). Both kinds of generalization have
been found empirically (e.g., Lee, Hayes, & Lovibond, 2018; Rouder & Ratcliff, 2006).
Furthermore, the changing shapes (or strength) of the prediction curves with increased
training (indicated by line shading) correspond to actual behavior observed by Jones,
Wills, and McLaren (1998).











Figure 8 . CAL’s learned associations to two categories (top; wio for categories ‘A’ and
‘B’ with solid and dashed lines, respectively) and resulting category ‘A’ predictions (piA;
bottom) with weaker contrasting (left) and stronger contrasting (right). For each, CAL
learned from the same sequence of stimuli (randomly drawn from the whole range) with
13 trials. Dotted vertical lines indicate the true category boundary. Shaded lines
represent trial-wise states (darker lines reflect later learning trials; last-trial is colored).
Learning modulation. CAL can inhibit the execution of dimension rules via
the modulator associations vmnjok (Equation 2; see also gray lines in Figure 5) as well as
rule learning for current modulators via Ωm (Equation 12). Learning about potential
modulators is achieved by registering the successes and failures of each simple rule on
the modulator score vmnjok. The score is updated for the active input J on a potential
modulator dimension n (with m 6= n) generalizing to adjacent nodes j.
For the matching outcome-response gates (o = k) the update is:







· (1.1 − αm=n)βn ·
(
5 − T ′ · vmnj(o=k)
)
(13)
For the mis-matching outcome-response gates (o 6= k) the update is the same but
the direction is reversed, indicated by the sign changes:







· (1.1 − αm=n)βn ·
(
5 + T ′ · vmnj(o6=k)
)
(14)
The parameter T ′ is a teaching signal, which becomes −1 if the simple rule
predicted the wrong outcome, but 1 otherwise. The parameter T is a combination of T ′
and the free parameter ω, which governs the strength of the update in an exponential
transform. Positive values of ω can be seen as an individual’s tendency or cognitive
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Generally, Equations 13 and 14 define decelerated growth functions, each with limits -5
and 5. Thus, if the current simple rule prediction was correct the modulator update
positively increases the association between the outcome node o to the same response
node k (i.e., o = k), but negatively to other response nodes (i.e., o 6= k), and vice versa
if the rule prediction was incorrect.
Due to the Gaussian generalization to adjacent modulator nodes j, CAL will tend
to modulate a dimension’s prediction in similar contexts. Weighting the update by
(1.1 − αm=n) means that a diagnostic rule can not become a strong modulator of
another rule. Weighting the term by βn (modulator diagnosticity) will reduce learning
about non-diagnostic modulators. However, according to the definitions in the ‘Rule
switching’ section, CAL can switch to using only simple rules, which leads to omitting
Equations 13 and 14. Furthermore, if a single modulator (e.g. n = 1) produces a strong
error (> θ), as defined above, then all its gating nodes vm1jok are re-initialized in this
step, which can be seen as a deliberate act of dropping these conditional hypotheses to
start learning new ones.
Attention. In CAL, dimensions and modulators attract attention (αm and βn), if
they have been learned to reliably predict outcomes and systematic errors, respectively.
For updating αm CAL screens the variation in the category evidence of a dimension m
across its nodes i (i.e., rmiP after the above updates), by taking the standard deviations






After this, αm is averaged with the previous αm (
∑
αm = 1). In cases where only
one stimulus dimension is assumed to be physically perceived (as in most classic
reinforcement learning studies), we assume the presence of a constant context dimension
(with attention initialized as 1/M) without that context dimension providing category
predictions, such that attention to the context dimension decreases over time. Thus, we
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assume that the experimental context serves as a modulator (for a similar approach see
Kruschke, 2001). For a concrete example of this usage, see our later section
‘Generalization, Discrimination and Individual Differences in Peak-Shift’.6
The update for the modulator diagnosticity, βn, is defined in a similar manner to
that of αm; in this case using the associations between the rule modulator n on its j














For each modulator n, the equation cycles through the possibly modulated
dimensions (except m = n). For each dimension m, the sum of associations on
mis-matching gates (o 6= k) is subtracted from the sum scores of matching gates (o = k)
on each j modulator node. A single j score will become positive without re-gating (i.e.,
o = k has positive and o 6= k has negative associations), but negative with re-gating
(i.e., o = k has negative and o 6= k has positive associations). Thus, if the scores
strongly vary over the j nodes, there is contextual modulation and the standard
deviation (SD) of these nodes will increase. For each modulated dimension the SD is
weighted with αm (i.e., the value before applying Equation 16) to neglect modulation of








The βn is then averaged with the previous βn (
∑
βn = 1). Note, that after a
modulator was reset (e.g., for n = 1, when encountering a strong modulation error),
which can only happen only once per trial, its SD will be zero (e.g., β′1 = 0). Since the
other modulators will have variance, averaging the update with the previous βn then
attenuates attention on n = 1 towards 0 over time.
Configural memory. Finally, a memory update strengthens the association hSP













6 We also provide an example for how to set up CAL’s input to simulate global context changes that
correlate with learning events (e.g., extinction) in the online manual on OSF.
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First, the parameter λ is a free memory strength parameter, and larger values
increase the updates’ strength. Second, the values of ∆hSP can range between 0 and B,
which is defined as B = 1/M · (C − 1), with M number of dimensions, and C number of
categories. Thus, in line with combination theory (Wills et al., 2015), the difficulty of
binding stimulus features into a configural representation increases with the number of
available dimensions and categories.
The stronger the error of the (modulated) rule, represented by zmIP , the stronger
the update, otherwise, the update approaches 0 if zmIP outweighs λ. Vice versa, larger
values of λ cancel out the influence of rule errors on the log scale (i.e., describing
enhanced memorization regardless of rule errors). In cases of probabilistic feedback, we
assume that prediction errors are uninformative about the exception status of an
instance. Therefore, we implemented that zmIP is removed from this equation from the
moment on, in which CAL receives feedback that contradicts the stored category
associations, which, however, merits further investigation. The term




sk ) represents the average of associative strengths of existing
memories (with F number of instances with non-zero associations). Adding this term
implements a decelerated learning function, annealing over time (see also Craig et al.,
2011; Kruschke & Johansen, 1999). Intuitively speaking, the more configural knowledge
CAL has, the less it learns.
Model Evaluations
In the following evaluations, we illustrate CAL’s scope and its ordinal predictions
of performance in different paradigms. After describing the general method, we first
report model simulations of, in this order, reinforcement learning on a single continuous
dimension addressing the peak-shift phenomenon (see Purtle, 1973) and individual
differences therein (e.g., Lee et al., 2018). We then illustrate category learning on two
continuous dimensions addressing spontaneous rule-extrapolation in disjunctive
category structures (i.e., incomplete XOR; Conaway & Kurtz, 2017). We then turn to
tasks with binary dimension, first focusing on learning performance in linear vs
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non-linearly separable categories (Medin & Schwanenflugel, 1981) and sub-group
specific learning of exception items therein (Levering, Conaway, & Kurtz, 2019). After
this, we simulate item-specific performance in the classic 5–4 category structure (Medin
& Schaffer, 1978), and eye-tracking patterns during learning the 5–4 structure (Rehder
& Hoffman, 2005b). Finally, we show how CAL, as introduced, predicts the ordinal
difficulty of the classic Six Problems (Shepard et al., 1961) and the influence of rule
instructions or learning strategies on Type II difficulty and response distributions
(Kurtz et al., 2013). Furthermore, we then use CAL as an individual process-tracing
model in the Six Problems eye-tracking study of Rehder and Hoffman (2005a) to assess
the model’s ability to predict individual eye-tracking trajectories during Type I and
Type II learning, in a cross-validation fashion.
Model Parameters and General Method
In the following simulations, we vary three of CAL’s modifiable parameters (i.e.,
generalization/contrasting γ, memory strength λ, and modulation learning ω) while
holding others fixed (e.g., the accuracy threshold for modulation errors similar to
Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994). Note that some modifiable parameters are
exponentially transformed within the equations set out above. In this article, we report
the values before these transformations. Stronger contrasting/narrow generalization
(lower values of γ) induces stronger hypotheses about the outcomes of stimuli (which
also affects the likelihood of detecting contextual modulation). Stronger memorization
(higher values of λ) lead to neglecting rule-errors in CAL’s exception learning but also
increase memory encoding in general, thereby representing a continuous shift towards a
pure memorization strategy. Stronger modulation strength (larger values of ω)
represents the ability or sensitivity of detecting and/or storing the contexts in which
errors of simple rules were encountered. We further highlight their use and meaning in
each section.
In each of the simulations, we will not only discuss average patterns, but also how
CAL predicts distributions of individual differences in the population of learners, and
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how external factors (e.g., instructions, practice, stimulus design) might affect these
predictions. Crucially, in contrast to the traditional approach of optimizing one fixed
set of parameters for a paradigm or study, we set the means and standard deviations
(normal distributions) for γ and λ based on theoretic considerations regarding the
cognitive process (or learning ability) of the assumed populations in each study.7 We
then simulated individual samples by randomly drawing parameters from each
distribution and passing them to CAL together with the learning tasks of the paradigm.
This also means, that the prior parameter distributions could be seen as a theoretically
constrained version of parameter-space partitioning (e.g., Pitt, Kim, Navarro, & Myung,
2006). To predict the results in a given study with multiple tasks (e.g., for the Six
Problems in Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994), we did not adjust the distributions
between tasks within that study.
Our theoretical considerations about study differences mainly concern the effects of
instructions and practice relative to CAL’s (or the participants’) engagement in rule
learning or memorization. For instance, we adjusted the contrasting parameter (γ) to
predict the effect of rule instructions on ordinal task difficulty in the Six Problems
(Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994) relative to a study without rule instructions
(Kurtz et al., 2013). We will explain the rationale for changing parameter distributions
between studies in each case.
Since the outlined simulations clearly show that CAL can accurately predict
several phenomena in a variety of paradigms which established models fail to predict
(e.g., spontaneous rule extrapolation in XOR, the effect of rule instructions on response
distributions in Type II, or a learning advantage of exception items in non-linearly
separable category structures), we did not further include traditional quantitative
model comparisons. Instead, as initially outlined, our final methodological approach
turns to the question of how well CAL can predict individual attention processes
indicated by eye-movement tracking, highlighting the model’s potential for studying
7 The distribution of ω was left unchanged in all simulations (except for the final process-tracing
approach which was based on parameter optimization).
CATEGORY ABSTRACTION LEARNING 41
relations to individual differences on external measures.
Generalization, Discrimination and Individual Differences in Peak-Shift
In the following, we show how CAL predicts a classic finding known in
reinforcement learning as the peak-shift phenomenon (see Hanson, 1959; Mackintosh,
1974; Purtle, 1973) and individual differences therein, as observed by Lee et al. (2018),
based on the general assumption of the complementary mechanisms of generalization
(Equation 10) and contrasting (Equation 11). A typical version of this paradigm is
illustrated in Figure 9, as used in the study of Lee et al. (2018). There are two learning
tasks, Generalization and Discrimination. In the Generalization task, participants
experience that one stimulus leads to an outcome (CS+; a shock) in 75% of the trials
(probabilistic), and in the Discrimination task, that one stimulus leads to the outcome
(CS+; probabilistic) while another one does not (CS-). Thereafter, unlabelled stimuli
from a broad range of stimuli (e.g., different colors or wavelengths) are tested on
outcome expectancy, which is plotted as a function of perceptual distance to the trained
stimuli (response gradient). In this paradigm, peak-shift refers to a change in the
response gradient in the Discrimination task, relative to the Generalization task. That
is, the peak of the CS+ gradient shifts away from the CS-, usually including ‘positive
contrast’ (see Mackintosh, 1974; , pp. 535 ff.) referring to the cross over of the response
gradients with an increase in response strength regarding CS+.
Peak shift can be observed in both human and non-human animals (e.g., Lee et al.,
2018; Livesey & McLaren, 2009; Lovibond, Lee, & Hayes, 2020; Lynn, Cnaani, & Papaj,
2005; Mackintosh, 1974; Purtle, 1973; Struyf, Iberico, & Vervliet, 2014), suggesting that
rather ‘low-level’ cognitive processes are involved. Accordingly, a traditional explanation
in theories of associative learning, among others, was that the CS+ and CS- overlap in
their (Gaussian) excitatory/inhibitory gradients. However, also the phenomenon of
behavioral contrast (Reynolds, 1961), which inspired CAL’s contrasting mechanism, has
been proposed to be related to the peak shift (see Purtle, 1973; pp. 413f), specifically to
an increase in response strength for the CS+ gradient in the Discrimination task.
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In human learning, researchers increasingly focus on individual differences in this
phenomenon distinguishing similarity-like behavior (e.g., exemplar-similarity or
feature-based) and rule-like behavior (e.g., Lee et al., 2018; Livesey & McLaren, 2009,
2019; Lovibond et al., 2020) and their relation to human personality traits (Nicholson &
Gray, 1972; Wong & Lovibond, 2018). For instance, in their recent fear-conditioning
study, Lee et al. (2018) gave their participants a strategy questionnaire, and found, in
the Generalization task, that the majority of the participants belonged either to a
‘Similarity’ group or a ‘No relation’ group. In the Discrimination task, most
participants described a ‘Similarity’ strategy or relational ‘Linear’ rules. Other patterns
were found for some participants, which is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this
article, and we focus on the mentioned sub-groups (see further Livesey & McLaren,
2009, 2019; Lovibond et al., 2020; Wong & Lovibond, 2018).
As can be seen in Figure 9A, in the Discrimination task (black squares), the
average gradient of the ‘Similarity’ sub-group was sine-shaped while the gradient in the
‘Linear’ sub-group rather corresponded to a more linear step-function. In the
Generalization task (crosses; ‘None’ in Figure 9A refers to ‘No relationship’) ‘No
relation’ and ‘Linear’ sub-groups were relatively equal. This pattern can be used to
illustrate CAL’s learning hypotheses.
Figure 9B shows CAL’s predictions from two simulations, each averaged across
2000 learning sequences sampled according to the methods reported in Lee et al. (2018).
Consider that a distinction between similarity vs linearity concerns CAL’s rule-learning
parameter γ. The notion of rule learning in this task, however, somewhat differs from
those in other simulations with binary feature dimensions. On binary dimensions, the
stimuli, by definition in CAL, populate the endpoints of the stimulus continuum. When
the stimuli are in the center, as in the current paradigm, stronger contrasting
symmetrically abstracts evidence for contrasting categories around the stimulus, while
weaker contrasting abstracts category evidence further away from the stimulus (see also
Figure 8), producing rather flat (γ ∼ 0), rather linear (γ ∼ −1), or more tightly
S-shaped (γ ∼ −3) gradients.
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Figure 9 . Peak-shift phenomenon and individual differences as studied in Lee et al.
(2018) Exp. 2. Learning Task illustrates conditioning phases in Generalization (left)
and Discrimination tasks (right; x-axes = cue-color continuum; vertical lines indicate
trained stimuli; circles represent trials with probabilistic outcomes for CS+). Test
depicts typical observed behavioral gradients during Test (y-axes = shock expectancy).
Lower panels show (A) data of strategy sub-groups (B) corresponding CAL
simulations with strong (top) versus moderate contrasting (bottom).
Since Lee et al. (2018) assigned the sub-groups using an external measure
(questionnaire) we simulated two relatively homogeneous populations with some
overlap. We simulated γ ∼ Gaussian(−2.3, .5) to reflect a ‘Similarity’ group, and
γ ∼ Gaussian(−1.7, .5) to reflect a ‘Linear/No relation’ group. Please note, following
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the argument by Kurtz et al. (2013) that continuous stimuli promote a mapping of
stimulus features on spatial representations, which is the conceptual basis for rule
learning in CAL, we assumed a slightly stronger and more homogeneous tendency of
contrasting, compared to the paradigms with binary stimulus dimensions.
Modulation was sampled with ω ∼ Gaussian(1, 1). Memorization was sampled
with λ ∼ Gaussian(−6, 1). This memory setting is not comparable to those in all other
simulations that follow due to the probabilistic feedback. If CAL notes that multiple
categories are associated with the same stimulus CAL switches from rule-error driven
encoding to Hebbian memorization, such that encoding becomes equally strong for all
observations, decreasing only over time. For this simulation, we also included a constant
context dimension (i.e., serving as modulation dimension without cue variation, and
without contributing to simple rules or memory predictions). Additionally,
reinforcement-learning research shows, that generalization of CS+ is steeper than for
CS- (e.g., Honig, Boneau, Burstein, & Pennypacker, 1963; Jenkins & Harrison, 1962;
Lovibond et al., 2020; see also Mackintosh, 1974, pp. 525 ff.). We included this
assumption by adding a value of 2 to γ when updating the dimension associations to
‘no shock’.
As can be seen in Figure 9, CAL accurately predicts the pattern of individual
differences due to variations in γ, including peak-shift, increased response strength in
the Discrimination condition (positive contrast), and the cross-over of response
probabilities. The weaker γ for ‘no shock’ also contributed to the quantitative accuracy
of the predictions, by flattening the gradients. To be transparent, although the group
differences depend on γ, the general pattern co-depends on other mechanisms in CAL
concerning the composition of diverse individual patterns (not shown).
Most importantly, CAL’s rule learning generally discounts probabilistic feedback
on CS+ due to the self-affirmative rule learning (belief updating) which counteracts
confusion. The reason that the predictions do not reach 0 or 100% on average, however,
lies in the variability of the individual gradients and the presence of the constant
context dimension. This global context dimension gates the prediction proportional to
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recent rule successes. Individual differences in the extent of this uncertainty (not
shown) depend on modulation strengths (ω) and trial order in the given samples (for a
related discussion on how context associations could also predict, e.g., latent inhibition,
see Kruschke, 2001).
Of course, several models can predict the peak-shift phenomenon, and potentially
also individual differences, including category-learning models. For instance, ATRIUM
(Erickson & Kruschke, 1998) by definition could predict a rule-like pattern in the
Discrimination task when assuming different rule-learning rates in each sub-group.
This, however, seems rather descriptive as its rules are defined by the researcher. Also,
ALCOVE (Kruschke, 1992), with a Gaussian similarity function, would predict a peak
shift and a reduction of it when adjusting its parameter governing the sensitivity to
exemplar-similarity. However, in exemplar models, adding CS– in the Discrimination
task introduces evidence against, not for, the + outcome. Consequently, additional
parameters would be required to also predict positive contrast or a cross-over of
response strengths. For both models, two further free parameters would be required: for
instance, a decision threshold to predict below 50% responding in the Generalization
condition, and an error-discounting parameter to deal with probabilistic feedback (see
Craig et al., 2011; Kruschke & Johansen, 1999).
Taken together, CAL predicts the classic and more recently studied facets of the
phenomenon known as peak-shift, and individual differences therein by adjusting the
strength of generalization/contrasting (γ). This fundamental ability seems to build a
valid basis to investigate more complex category-learning processes and paradigms.
Furthermore, the results illustrate one of CAL’s novel theoretical contributions. That is,
the single aspects of the outlined individual differences in generalization behavior were
previously separately accounted for by qualitatively different models (or modules) such
as feature-based (or exemplar-similarity) processing versus rule-based processing (see
further Hahn & Chater, 1998; Pothos, 2005). In CAL, similarity- and rule-like trends
result from the same cognitive mechanism of rule-learning, which includes the core
principles of belief updating and lateral inhibition, continuously varying in its precision
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(γ). In the following, we present further cases in which similar variations on γ can also
explain observed strategy-like differences in (multi-dimensional) category learning tasks.
Extrapolation in incomplete XOR
We hypothesized that, as in the previous task, individual differences in contrasting
can also explain individual differences in interpolation versus extrapolation after
learning an incomplete XOR task (see Figure 10A), as the strength of contrasting
influences the likelihood of contextual modulation. Specifically, although the
participants in Conaway and Kurtz (2017) only learned about the stimulus-categories
depicted in Figure 10A without learning about the lower right ‘?’ quadrant of the
stimulus space, some participants still extrapolated ‘B’ in a later test phase (31% and
45% of participants in Exp. 1 and 2, respectively).
Besides learning about category labels, this task is quite similar to the above
Discrimination task, but the contingency (e.g., large values on Dimension 2 → B, small
values → A) depends on the second stimulus dimension (e.g., only for low but not for
high values on Dimension 1). Thus, from a CAL perspective, the same dynamics apply
as in the Discrimination task, except for enabling the model to encode the stimulus
dimensions as (potential) rule modulators. That is, first, variations in contrasting lead
to rather sharp or rather flat gradients (with low and high γ, respectively) on each
dimension. Second, however, in incomplete XOR, sharp gradients (labeled ’similarity
like’ in the conditioning task), rather than flat gradients (previously labeled ’rule like’),
produce strong predictions for unobserved instances in the stimulus space. With sharp
gradients (with low γ; strong contrasting), thus, CAL will produce frequent rule errors
correlating with the values of the other dimension, which gives rise to contextual
modulation, even if there is a quadrant unobserved. In this case, CAL predicts
spontaneous extrapolation of the complete XOR category structure.
To simulate this phenomenon, we generated 3000 random sequences of 8 stimuli (2
‘B’ stimuli [presented twice], and 4 ‘A’ stimuli, as illustrated in Figure 10A) within 12
training blocks, identical to the procedure in Conaway and Kurtz (2017), and presented
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Figure 10 . CAL simulation of incomplete XOR, as studied in Conaway and Kurtz
(2017). (A) Coordinate grid with stimulus locations for categories ‘A’ and ‘B’. Grey
cells (‘?’) show nine critical test items. (B) Mean simulated response gradients during
test for ‘extrapolation’ participants (i.e. with mean P(B) > .6 for the critical items).
Shading indicates response probability; black=100% ‘A’. (C) As (B), for ‘interpolation’
participants (with P(B) ≤ .6). (D) Simulated participants, grouped by the number of
category ‘B’ responses on the nine critical items. Lower panel: Distribution of number
of critical ‘B’ responses across 3000 samples (zero = full interpolation; nine = full
extrapolation). Upper panel: CAL’s γ sample parameter, as a function of the predicted
critical ‘B’ responses.
them to CAL. We sampled contrasting with γ ∼ Gaussian(−1.75, .75) similar to the
population as in the simulation of the peak-shift phenomenon. Again, contrasting here
is stronger than for the following simulations with rather qualitative binary dimensions
following the argument that continuous stimuli are easier to map on spatial
representations (Kurtz et al., 2013). Again, we sampled modulation with
ω ∼ Gaussian(1, 1), and memory strength with λ ∼ Gaussian(−.5, 1.5) (which both are
CATEGORY ABSTRACTION LEARNING 48
identical to the subsequent simulation ‘D2’ for the Six Problems)8. We then divided the
3000 samples according to the resulting predicted behavior into two groups -
‘extrapolators’ (those with an average P(B) ≥ .6 on the critical test items) and
‘interpolators’ (with average P(B) < .6; identical to the procedure of Conaway & Kurtz,
2017). We then averaged the predictions on each stimulus within these two groups.
Figure 10B shows the extrapolators, who made up 37.3% of the sample. Figure 10C
shows the interpolators, who made up the remainder of the sample.
The two panels of Figure 10D show CAL’s frequency of ‘B’ responses in the
untrained quadrant (‘?’) and the corresponding γ samples. First, for the lower panel,
we counted the number of ‘B’ choices in each sample in the untrained (grey) quadrant
in the test phase (0–9 reduced category responses). The histogram, thus, shows the
frequency of extrapolated ‘B’ responses across the 3000 simulations (for comparison see
Figures 6 and 11 in Conaway & Kurtz, 2017). The depicted distribution of ‘B’
responses in the untrained quadrant is compatible with the result Conaway and Kurtz
(2017) observed. To our knowledge, there are no other published models that would be
able to predict this pattern.
Second, the upper panel shows the corresponding γ values plotted against the
predicted number of extrapolation responses. Apparently, the relation between γ and
the predicted number of extrapolation responses is not deterministic (with about
r = −.33). That is, while frequent extrapolation mainly occurred with values of γ = −2
and interpolation with larger values, lowering γ < −2.5 decreased the number of
extrapolation responses as well. That is, too narrow generalization (γ < −2.5) during
the modulation update could prevent that contextual modulation (if learned) applies in
the whole unobserved quadrant. For example, registered modulation on values 6 or 7 of
Dimension 1 would hardly generalize to value 5 with very precise generalization (hence
reducing the number of ‘B’ responses).
8 In order to simulate empirical measurement error (or probabilistic responding), we used CAL’s
predicted average response probability for the nine critical items and sampled nine observations from a
binomial distribution.
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In summary, CAL’s predictions corresponded quite closely to the average
behavioral response gradients in the two participant groups of Conaway and Kurtz
(2017; see their Figures 6 and 7), as well as to the observed proportion of participants
who extrapolated category ‘B’ in the untrained quadrant. CAL’s explanation of this
phenomenon highlights the possibility that such individual differences stem from
contrasting processes (inverse generalization), a mechanism that triggers contextual
modulation. The same variation in the strength of contrasting predicted individual
differences in the peak shift. This allows bringing both phenomena together on a
common scale, but with different implications due to the diverging strategy-like effects
of changes in γ. Taken together, these insights provide a coherent picture of the
hypothesized cognitive processes underlying category learning. These, as we will show
in the following sections, also accurately predict the observed patterns of performance
in the classic Six Problems (Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994; Shepard et al., 1961)
and individual differences therein (Kurtz et al., 2013) and observed individual
differences in learning linearly versus non-linearly separable category structures.
Contextual Modulation in Linear and Non-Linear Category Structures
Another task in which learning of simple rules and their contextual modulation
provides a reasonable explanation of diverse empirical phenomena concerns studies on
linear separability constraints, as introduced by Medin and Schwanenflugel (1981).
Figure 11 depicts a typical implementation. Linear separability (LS) here refers to the
possibility to divide the category space by a weighted-additive rule resulting in a linear
category boundary (i.e., a diagonal plane in Figure 11), while this is impossible in the
non-linear structure (NLS). Note that LS and NLS, respectively, are incomplete versions
of Types IV and III of the classic Types by Shepard et al. (1961), discussed in our next
section. Unlike the classic Types III and IV, which seem equally difficult, NLS learning
has been observed to be easier than LS, most recently discussed from a modeling
perspective by Levering et al. (2019).
In short, while independent-cue models predict an LS advantage (e.g., prototype
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Figure 11 . Three-dimensional illustration of linearly (LS) versus non-linearly separable
(NLS) category structures (numbers indicate stimulus coordinates [x,y,z]). Letters refer
to item types in NLS (P = Protoype, I = Intermediate, E = Exception; see text).
models; Posner & Keele, 1968; Reed, 1972), similarity-based (exemplar- or cluster)
models of categorization (Kruschke, 1992; Love et al., 2004; Medin & Schwanenflugel,
1981), or auto-encoder models (DIVA; Kurtz, 2007) can predict an NLS advantage.
Also, rule models can accommodate this pattern when assuming quicker learning of rule
exceptions in NLS than in LS (Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994). Thus, the first
goal in this section is to show how CAL’s contextual modulation accounts for this
finding. The second goal, however, is to propose novel CAL predictions concerning more
detailed open questions raised by Levering et al. (2019). That is, we show how CAL
predicts observed individual differences in responding to specific category items, which
established models fail to predict.
For clarity, the stimulus coordinates [x,y,z] and item notations in Figure 11 (‘P’,
‘I’, ‘E’ as Prototype, Intermediate, and Exception, respectively) follow those used by
Levering et al. (2019), referring to the item properties in the NLS structure. The
‘Prototype’ items in NLS are most similar to all other items in their category, and so
forth, for ‘I’ and ‘E’ items. From a CAL perspective, however, three simple (but
imperfect) rules can be solely derived by observing the dominant dimension-category
regularities covering four out of six items (e.g., on dimension x [0,_,_] → A and [1,_,_]
→ B covers four items; or on dimension y [_,0,_] → A and [_,1,_] → B covers four
items; and likewise on dimension z).
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‘P’ items in NLS have the property that they are covered by any of these dominant
rules, which generally predicts high accuracy for ‘P’ items. For ‘I’ items, however, this
is only true for dimension z ([_,_,0] → B and [_,_,1] → A), while this is never true for
‘E’ items. Here, each rule that correctly predicts ‘P’ or ‘I’ always treats one of the ‘E’
items as an exception. In CAL, each of these simple rules is equally likely from the
beginning, which, without further learning assumptions, translates to an ordinal
prediction of item accuracy in NLS (‘P’ > ‘I’ > ‘E’), but not in LS, in which each item
would be an exception for one of these three rules.
Importantly, beyond simple rules, contextual modulation contributes to CAL’s
predicted NLS performance. In particular, an initially learned rule on dimension x
([0,_,_] → A and [1,_,_] → B) would lead to rule-errors on items E[1,0,0] and I[0,1,0],
which happen to share the same value on z [_,_,0]. Thus, when CAL learns this x-rule,
it will also learn contextual modulation when z takes the value 0. This solution, indeed,
almost solves the complete structure, with only one remaining modulation exception of
item P[1,1,0], which is then encoded in configural memory9. In contrast, contextual
modulation in LS rather confuses CAL’s learning performance, because the model
suspects and applies different modulators, of which none is reliable. Another aspect
predicted by contextual modulation in NLS is that extrapolating this kind of
disjunctive category structure leads to quick learning of exceptions with sometimes even
steeper learning curves than for ‘P’ and ‘I’ items (discussed below).
Our CAL simulation is depicted in Figure 12, summarizing 20000 learning
sequences simulated according to the methods reported in Levering et al. (2019). We
sampled γ ∼ Gaussian(−.5, 1.5), ω ∼ Gaussian(−1, 1), and λ ∼ Gaussian(−.5, 1), which
are identical distributions as in the following simulations of the Six Problems (D2; we
applied trial-wise binomial noise before by-participant aggregation within each block).
As can be seen in Figure 12A, CAL’s predicted learning curves (with modulation
enabled) show a clear NLS advantage, which is the observed result (see Levering et al.,
9 A more rare but logically identical solution would arise if CAL, due to trial order or strong
contrasting, abstracts the z-rule ([_,_,0] → A and [_,_,1] → B), and then modulates it if x = 1.
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Figure 12 . CAL simulation of learning LS versus NLS category structures. (A)
Predicted CAL learning curves (accuracy; y-axis) over Training Blocks (x-axis). (B)
Distribution of overall differences in accuracy (NLS – LS; x-axis) in 500 simulated
experiments (N = 40 each), either with contextual modulation enabled (blue) or
disabled (orange). Error bars depict means and 95% intervals. Black triangle shows
effect size observed by Levering et al. (2019). (C) Simulated within-NLS distribution of
all 20000 samples on by-participant item differences (E – [I + P]/2; as in Figure 11),
divided into sub-groups separated by vertical lines (WE = weak exception, ME =
moderate exception, SE = strong exception), and (D) corresponding item accuracy
predictions. Black triangles represent data from Levering et al. (2019).
2019, Figure 4). CAL with the current setting, however, predicts a stronger effect than
in Levering et al. (2019). Importantly, the effect size prediction could be reduced by a
higher mean of the γ distribution (weaker contrasting), which also points towards the
source of the advantage. As mentioned above, contextual modulation can hinder
learning LS, and weaker contrasting reduces the model’s tendency to apply modulation
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(which also would reduce the ease of learning ‘E’ items in NLS). Weaker contrasting,
thus, allows the model to either integrate all rules equally or to learn a
rules-plus-exception solution, which is more reliable without modulation in LS.
Importantly, Levering et al. (2019) discuss that an NLS advantage is not always
statistically significant across different studies, suggesting sample size issues in light of
rather weak effects. Therefore, they provided a large-scale study (N > 100 in each
problem) obtaining an overall NLS advantage (collapsed across all learning trials) of
about 6% relative to LS (d = .46; black triangle in Figure 12B). Based on this effect and
the sample size in the study of Medin and Schaffer (1978) they estimated a statistical
Power of 26%, which calls for investigations with larger sample sizes.
To further estimate the variability of the predicted effect itself, we split up CAL’s
20000 samples into repeated ‘experiments’ each with N = 40. Figure 12B shows the
resulting distribution of standardized effect sizes over the 500 experiments. Instead of
illustrating different settings of γ, which would moderate the effect (as for incomplete
XOR, or Type II in the section ‘Rule Instructions in the Six Problems’), we want to
extend the space of potential research questions, by disabling modulation completely.
From a CAL perspective, there seem to be several design choices that could
prevent contextual modulation, such as integral stimuli or cognitive load. But also
manipulations that could affect CAL’s currently fixed error thresholds, which, if allowed
to vary, would lead to individual differences in rejecting modulation sooner or later. In
this vein, Figure 12A (orange) shows that CAL’s LS performance increases without
modulation, which would also happen if modulation was rejected earlier. The
corresponding distribution of overall effects approaches zero. With this, CAL provides
testable hypotheses about possible influences on learning LS versus NLS structures.10
To gain more insight, Levering et al. (2019) also investigated item-specific
performance on the ‘P’, ‘I’ and ‘E’ items in sub-groups of participants in the NLS task.
Specifically, they first subtracted each participant’s average learning accuracy for
10 Manipulation of cognitive load might also affect other cognitive mechanisms. Thus, the central CAL
prediction would be an equivalence of NLS and LS learning under cognitive load.
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non-exceptions from ‘E’ accuracy, which we equally did for each of CAL’s samples.
Thus, negatives scores indicate worse individual ‘E’ performance than for other items in
the NLS task (see their Figure 5). Figure 12C shows the resulting sample distribution
for CAL’s two simulations. With modulation enabled, the distribution closely resembles
that observed by Levering et al. (2019), including the elongated tail for negative scores.
The simulation with modulation disabled is broader, and also shows that modulation in
NLS increases the proportion of samples with strong ‘E’ performance, which is crucial
for the second important finding of Levering et al. (2019).
The authors sorted their participants into three sub-groups by M + −.5SD on this
score (indicated by the vertical dashed lines in Figure 12C), summarizing participants
with weak (WE), moderate (ME), or strong (SE) exception performance, relative to ‘P’
and ‘I’. They then calculated item-specific learning performances in each sub-group.
Their obtained averages are depicted in Figure 12D (black triangles) next to CAL’s
predictions for each simulation. As can be seen, CAL predicts these patterns with a
subtle but important difference between the two simulations in sub-group SE. In
particular, Levering et al. (2019) discuss that they are not aware of any modeling
account that would predict stronger performance on ‘E’ than on ‘P’. Indeed, CAL
predicts this advantage when modulation is enabled, but not when disabled. That is,
without modulation a strong rule is necessary to store exceptions eventually (which
seems to be true for RULEX as well; Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994).
Please note, that the general pattern of the two simulations in the WE and ME
groups does not differ because in both cases the ordinal pattern is predicted by
rule-plus-exception learning. The two groups mainly differ in their strength of memory
encoding (λ). With modulation, however, some SE samples of CAL learn exceptions
even more quickly than other item types. In comparison, the question seems to arise
whether the complete empirical distribution in Levering et al. (2019) might be better
captured by assuming a mixture of the two simulations, again, concerning the
participants’ tendency to learn and execute modulation.
In general, with CAL’s predictions, it is also possible to relate learning accuracy to
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the typicality ratings which Levering et al. (2019) obtained for all items (see their
Figure 5). That is, within each sub-group, typicality showed an ordinal correspondence
to learning accuracy, which CAL could cover based on its item-specific predictions.
However, there are differences between the sub-groups, most importantly, showing that
group SE indicated nearly equal typicality for all items (i.e., ‘P’ became less, and ‘E’
more typical, compared to WE and ME), tending to the mid of the scale. The authors
argue, that this pattern might be due to strong memorization in this group.
Interestingly, on average, CAL’s SE samples stored less information in memory
than ME samples. However, learning in both WE and ME samples resulted in the same
hierarchy of encoding strength of ‘P’, ‘I’ and ‘E’ (ascending), reflecting
rule-plus-exception solutions. In contrast, CAL’s SE samples, as described, solved the
task by contextual modulation. In this task, this means ‘P’ items became less typical
(in the rule module of CAL) and ‘E’ items became more typical, which led to weaker
and relatively equal memory strengths. Bringing these aspects together into a
prediction of typicality seems to be an interesting topic for future research.
In sum, CAL not only predicts the classic (but sometimes non-observed) NLS
advantage (Medin & Schwanenflugel, 1981) but also item-specific individual differences
observed by Levering et al. (2019), of which the latter seems not accounted for by other
models. In addition, CAL provides novel testable predictions about the effects of
cognitive load on the learning of LS and NLS category structures, through the effect of
load on the ability or willingness to learn and continuously apply simple rules or
contextual modulation, which may also be extendable to typicality data in this task.
Rules and Exceptions in the 5-4 Problem
In their classic study, Medin and Schaffer (1978) introduced the 5-4 category
structure depicted in Figure 13A (Training; labels ‘A’ and ‘B’ refer to categories; rows
represent stimuli with four dimensions [columns H1, H2, M, L] with different
diagnosticity). Note, simple rules (on ‘H1’ and/or ‘H2’) would lead to acceptable
performance when tolerating or learning their exceptions (A5/B1 and A4/B2,
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Figure 13 . 5-4 problem (Medin & Schaffer, 1978). (A) Category structure with 9
Training items (rows, 5 in category ‘A’, 4 in ‘B’) and 7 Transfer items (right) with
binary features on four dimensions (H1, L, H2, M with [H]igh, [L]ow, and [M]edium
diagnosticity). (B) Schematic illustration for cases of L = 1 and L = 0 (see text).
respectively), and item B4 is the prototype of category B. The right table in Figure 13
shows Transfer stimuli, usually presented in a final test phase without feedback.
The 5–4 problem is often used to test the predictions of exemplar, prototype and
rule models against each other (e.g., M. Blair & Homa, 2003; Johansen, Fouquet,
Savage, & Shanks, 2013; Johansen & Palmeri, 2002b; Lamberts, 1995; Medin, Dewey, &
Murphy, 1983; Minda & Smith, 2002; Nosofsky, 2000; Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley,
1994; J. D. Smith & Minda, 2000; Zaki, Nosofsky, Stanton, & Cohen, 2003). One key
result to explain is that participants often learn item A2 more quickly than A1. The A2
advantage is predicted by reference-point similarity models (e.g., exemplar or cluster
models, such as GCM, ALCOVE, SUSTAIN; Kruschke, 1992; Love et al., 2004;
Nosofsky, 1986), while the inverted pattern would be predicted by prototype models
(Medin & Schaffer, 1978; J. D. Smith & Minda, 2000). The rule-plus-exception model
RULEX (Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994) also predicts the advantage because
“when exceptions are formed for classifying A1, they often need to be discarded because
they lead to incorrect classifications of stimuli in the contrast category” (p. 60; but see
also Shen & Palmeri, 2016). In other words, the A2 advantage can be explained by
cluster, exemplar, or rule-plus-exception learning, providing strong reasons to assume
that memory-processing in some way influences learning performance in this task.
In the following, we first describe how CAL predicts an A2 advantage, and then
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Figure 14 . CAL simulations of the 5-4 task. (A) Simulated learning advantage for A2
over A1 (y-axis = accuracy). (B1) Data from Medin and Schaffer (1978) Exp. 2, and
Rehder and Hoffman (2005b), and (B2) CAL simulation of test-phase for choosing
category ‘A’ (y-axes). See text for simulation settings of CAL1 and CAL2. (C1)
Block-wise attention predictions derived from CAL2; H1 and H2 overlap; dotted
horizontal lines mark 20% and 30% for better comparison with (C2), showing the
fixation proportions as measured by Rehder and Hoffman (2005b). (D) Distributions of
attention proportions of individuals and CAL (each aggregated over last 5 blocks;
dotted lines mark probabilities in steps of 10%). Circles represent median estimates.
discuss other types of learning routes and resulting predictions. Since multiple models
could account for behavior in this task, we also take a process perspective in an
investigation of how participants attend to non-diagnostic dimensions based on the
eye-tracking results obtained by Rehder and Hoffman (2005b). First, when learning the
5–4 structure, CAL generally picks up that ‘H1’ and/or ‘H2’ are the most diagnostic
dimensions, leading to the strongest rule predictions (1 → A). When encountering the
exceptions of the ‘H1’ rule (i.e., A5 and B1 in Figure 13), CAL encodes these into
memory (much more strongly than rule-conforming items). Thus, these items will exert
a bias on their nearest neighbors (but less on more distant stimuli) of the contrasting
category. This predicts an A2 advantage over A1, because A1’s nearest neighbors are
B1, B2 and A2, but A2 is hardly stored in memory (see Figure 14A).
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However, just as in previously inspected tasks, the rule errors of the most
diagnostic dimensions H1 and H2 coincide with values on the remaining dimensions.
That is, with ‘L = 0’, both rules ‘H1’ and ‘H2 correctly predict the stimulus categories
(Figure 13B), which reinforces these rules if ‘L = 0’. On each dimension, however, ‘H1’
and ‘H2’ rule errors occur when the ‘L’ dimension takes the value 1. Under normal
circumstances, CAL registers this context to modulate the rule errors. This entails that
‘L’ receives some attention early in learning, despite being hardly diagnostic (further
discussed below). In subsequent trials, the modulating context ‘L = 1’, however, also
(over)predicts modulation of, for example, the ‘H1’ rule for stimuli A1, A4, and B2,
which would lead to modulation errors. These cases of early A1 errors have not
necessarily systematic effects in CAL’s responding, because they lead CAL to encode
these modulation exceptions in configural memory. Eventually, CAL rejects ‘L’ if strong
modulation errors repeat and exceed the defined threshold.
The upper panel in Figure 14B1 illustrates test data from two studies. First,
compared to Rehder and Hoffman (2005b), the participants in Medin and Schaffer
(1978) Exp. 2 show stronger test performance on the rule exceptions A4, A5, B1 and
B5, and transfer item T5. While Rehder and Hoffman (2005b) did not seem to use
strategy-inducing instructions, Medin and Schaffer (1978) instructed their participants
that the experiment was about how “we store information in memory” (p. 219). In line
with the argument by Kurtz et al. (2013) that instructions affect how people engage in
the task, it seems possible that Medin and Schaffer (1978) induced a memorization
strategy, which could have affected the participants’ performance relative to Rehder and
Hoffman (2005b).
With CAL, one can capture both patterns. Taking the study of Rehder and
Hoffman (2005b) as a reference point, the main characteristic predicted by CAL is that
the exception items (A4, A5, B1, B2) are learned more slowly than rule-conforming
items. In CAL, ‘memory’ instructions can be represented by increasing the strength of
memory encoding (λ), relative to ‘no instructions’. Due to CAL’s rule-exception
learning, this leads to the item-specific prediction that learning exception items
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increases substantially, without strong benefit for other items which are covered by
simple imperfect rules, except for T5. Item T5 has three nearest neighbors in this task,
and two of them happen to be the exception items A4 and A5. With stronger memory,
thus, CAL would predict that these two instances should more strongly affect
responding to T5 (increased A responses) as it is the only item for which the rule
predictions ‘H1’ and ’H2’ (both B) would be inverted by exception memory if strong
memory ‘intervenes’ (see Equation 9).
To illustrate this hypothesis, we simulated CAL two times with 2000 randomly
generated learning sequences according to the methods reported by Rehder and
Hoffman (2005b), but without learning criterion. Generalization/contrasting was
sampled with γ ∼ Gaussian(−.5, 1.5), modulation strength with ω ∼ Gaussian(1, 1), as
done for the LS and NLS simulation. We sampled memory strength with
λ ∼ Gaussian(−4, 1.5), which is identical to simulations of the other eye-tracking study
of Rehder and Hoffman (2005a) investigating the Six Problems (D4; see next section).
Our two simulations of the 5-4 problem differed as follows. Taking the study of Rehder
and Hoffman (2005a) as reference point, we used the above parameter distributions,
denoted CAL2 in Figure 14. To simulate memory instructions (Medin & Schaffer, 1978)
we added a value of 2.5 to λ, denoted CAL1. Since we later also derived eye-tracking
predictions from CAL2, we additionally simulated salience effects in each sample (one
random feature received four times more attention) but only applied to the updates in
the very first trial for both simulations, as Rehder and Hoffman (2005b) discuss a
corresponding result (the assignment of logical to physical features, however, was
counter-balanced in their study).
As can be seen in Figure 14B2, the two simulated predictions very well
approximate the pattern of both studies. However, it is important to validate the model
assumptions on other measures as well. With their eye-tracking study, Rehder and
Hoffman (2005b) provide a great opportunity to do so. Figure 14C2 shows their
obtained average fixation proportions (before and after a decision) on the four features
over training blocks, together with CAL’s attention predictions (C1). The data were
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first aggregated within each participant and then collapsed across all participants.
CAL’s attention predictions were derived accordingly, using its trial-wise estimates for
αm and βn. Following the logic of the model, we averaged the attention weights on each
dimension when contextual modulation was active but used αm only when CAL
rejected modulation in a given trial. Before aggregation over blocks, we additionally
passed the trial-wise predictions to a four-dimensional Dirichlet distribution to simulate
random fluctuations (e.g., due to scanning or distractions).
As Rehder and Hoffman (2005b) discuss, participants’ allocation of attention to
the stimulus features in the 5-4 task (as measured by eye tracking) could be considered
non-optimal, given that the classification task can be solved perfectly while ignoring ‘L’
completely. CAL, likewise, ‘sub-optimally’ attends to ‘L’ because it initially suspects
dimension ‘L’ to be a modulator, only rejecting it as such when strong modulation
errors accumulate. On average this rejection happens from Training block 13 on
(Figure 14C1). The other dimensions still compete for subjective diagnosticity without
a clear winner.
To illustrate the extent to which CAL predicts individual differences in attention
to ‘L’ (Figure 14D), we averaged each participant’s or sample’s feature attention across
the last five training blocks. In some samples, CAL gave up (i.e. ignored) ‘L’ as
modulator completely and focused on the simple rules. In other cases, CAL kept
attending to ‘L’, either as a modulator or due to generally weak rule learning (γ).
However, while CAL predicts a non-normal distribution of attention to ‘L’ the current
simulation somewhat under-predicts attention to ‘M’. Either the number of considered
modulators, or variations of the fixed modulator rejection threshold or the rule accuracy
threshold would lead to different predictions, and again, it seems worth investigating
the psychological variables that could predict a participant’s tolerance for modulation
errors or alternative hypotheses.
Taken together, CAL’s current hypotheses account well for behavioral patterns in
the classic 5–4 task, including the standard A2 advantage, the general trend of response
gradients, and between-study variability on exception learning potentially due to
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memory instructions. It also predicts the trend of ignoring the least diagnostic
dimension in the second half of learning resulting in a non-normal distribution of
attention. Importantly, as for the NLS–LS paradigm (Medin & Schwanenflugel, 1981),
CAL’s predictions would change, for instance, under manipulations that hinder
contextual modulation (e.g., cognitive load, integral stimuli). In this case, CAL would
predict either a reduction of the A2 advantage (with strong memory) or even a
complete reversal because without modulation ‘L’ (but also ‘M’) are more frequently
considered to provide simple rules (which is prevented by the model’s definition if they
were modulators). That is, CAL then predicts more frequent rule errors (on ‘L’ and
‘M’) for A2 than for A1. Thus, the general question of whether or not participants
(either systematically or individually) engage in simple rules, contextual modulation, or
memorization, again, seems to be an interesting avenue for future research, perhaps
including further investigations of how memory versus rule instructions might affect
performance – as we further discuss in the next section.
Rule Instructions in the Six Problems
Our initial reason for developing CAL was to address the question, raised by Kurtz
et al. (2013), of why an instruction to ‘learn categorization rules’ versus ‘no
instructions’ affects the ordinal pattern of difficulty in the classic Six Problems,
introduced by Shepard et al. (1961). The category structures are depicted in
Figure 15A. Kurtz et al. (2013) observed that rule instructions especially affected the
rate of learning in the Type II problem, but not in the other five Types. CAL is a
formal expression of our answer to this question, which is twofold. From the perspective
of CAL, only the Type II problem can be perfectly solved by contextual modulation
(e.g., ‘large’ → category ‘A’ and small → ‘B’, for circles, but invert the rule for
squares). Thus, if rule instructions affect the likelihood of abstracting simple rules that
trigger their modulation, this should only affect the Type II performance, without
affecting the pattern for the other Types. We first focus on this central prediction and
turn to how CAL learns the other Types in the simulation below.
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As in the previous tasks, CAL generally begins by learning which of the multiple
dimensions could serve as a simple rule (e.g., large → category ‘A’, and small → ‘B’).
Then, in Type II, CAL learns that, for instance, the shape dimension is a modulator of
this rule (apply for ‘circle’, but invert for ‘square’). However, before CAL can learn
about the role of the ‘shape’ dimension, the initial rule (e.g., for ‘size’) needs to be well
established enough to produce strong and systematic prediction errors. Compared with
the previous tasks, however, creating such a simple rule through direct observation
alone is more difficult because the as-yet-unlearned context (circle vs. square), and
hence the correct rule, changes from trial to trial.
However, CAL can establish a simple rule in a single trial by extrapolating beyond
what is observed. For example, the contrasting mechanism in CAL infers that ‘small’ →
‘B’ after having only seen ‘large’ → ‘A’. The strength of this process is governed by γ
(smaller values = stronger contrasting). Assuming random variations on γ, representing
normally distributed individual differences, creates the novel prediction in CAL that
distinguishes the model from alternative learning accounts regarding the Six Problems.
Simulations. From a modeling perspective, two key aspects characterize the
phenomenon observed by Kurtz et al. (2013). The first aspect concerns the reduced
learning speed in Type II without rule instructions (I > II, III, IV, V > VI) relative to
the pattern with rule instructions (I > II > III, IV, V > VI; e.g., Shepard et al., 1961;
Nosofsky, Gluck, et al., 1994), such that other problem types are unaffected.
Second, performance on the Type II problem without rule instructions appears to
be non-normally distributed, varying in different experiments from left-skewed, through
apparently bi-modal, to right-skewed (see Figure 4 in Kurtz et al., 2013). Consistent
with Kurtz et al. (2013), we argue that rule instructions increase the tendency of
contrasting (i.e., homogeneous strong abstraction of regularities for non-observed
instances in the population), otherwise, we assume more heterogeneous individual
differences in contrasting leading to the non-normal distributions of performance and
the resulting change of ordinal difficulty.
Furthermore, the strength of CAL’s memorization depends on the magnitude of its
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Figure 15 . (A) Six Problems (Shepard et al., 1961). Shading indicates categories,
circles represent stimulus coordinates in three dimensions. (B) CAL simulations of the
classic pattern (sample D1) and the revised pattern (D2; Kurtz et al., 2013). See text
for explanations and Figure 16 for CAL settings.
rule errors. Thus, if CAL does not find a rule in Type II (which, with weak contrasting,
will happen in some proportion of simulations), it would predict the same performance
as in Type VI, in which there is no feature dimension constituting a rule. In Type I,
CAL in any case will learn the rule quickly since reliable simple rules develop due to
both observation and abstraction. Type III–V, for CAL, are mainly rule-plus-exception
category structures such that in each Type performance reaches 75% quickly (i.e., 6 out
of 8 items are covered by a simple rule), while further increments depend on attempted
modulation and exception learning.
In the latter, there is a non-obvious difference in CAL’s attempted solutions
between these three Problem Types, which however does not produce different average
predictions. In particular, first, Type III has two equally diagnostic dimensions, Type
IV has three, and Type V has one. Second, as similarly discussed for the reduced
versions of Type IV and III (LS and NLS structures, respectively), the exceptions in
Type V (similar to NLS before) share the same value on one non-diagnostic dimension.
In Type V, CAL will occasionally learn this modulator before noticing that it is either
imperfect (non-exclusive) or yields frequent modulation errors in other instances.
The non-obvious consequence is occasional modulator-induced error discounting,
which establishes the most diagnostic rule in Type V more strongly compared to Types
CATEGORY ABSTRACTION LEARNING 64
III and IV. On the one hand, this leads to more accurate simple rule predictions in
Type V than in Types III and IV. On the other hand, it also prevents encoding of
temporarily modulated exceptions during configural memory by reducing the
corresponding error signal. Without modulators in Types III and IV, the rules tend to
be less determined (also because equally diagnostic dimensions compete) but relatively
stable, such that more frequent errors lead to quicker encoding of exceptions.
D1 γ ∼ Gaussian(−3, .5)
λ ∼ Gaussian(.5, 1.5)
D2 γ ∼ Gaussian(−.5, 1.5)
λ ∼ Gaussian(−.5, 1.5)
D3 γ ∼ Gaussian(−.5, 1.5)
λ ∼ Gaussian(3, 1.5)
D4 γ ∼ Gaussian(−.5, 1.5)
λ ∼ Gaussian(−4, 1.5)
Mean Accuracy in First 8 Blocks
Figure 16 . CAL simulations for the Six Problems (Shepard et al., 1961), under four
different parameter settings: D1 (strong contrasting γ, “with rule instructions”, and
enhanced memorization λ with practice), D2 (moderate contrasting, no practice), D3
(moderate contrasting, extensive practice), D4 (moderate contrasting, no practice with
difficult visual stimuli). Histograms depict CAL’s overall sample distributions after
averaging accuracy across the eight training blocks (as done in Kurtz et al., 2013).
They are plotted together with empirical distributions from four studies in the
background (orange; see text) for each Problem that was part of the respective study.
To simulate learning in the Six Problems, we presented CAL with eight blocks of
training (the length of training in Kurtz et al., 2013), and simulated 1000 learning
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sequences for each Problem. In all simulations, we sampled ω ∼ Gaussian(1, 1). To
simulate the instruction effect in Figures 15 and 16 (D1 and D2), we sampled values
from the two different γ distributions with either low values of γ from a homogeneous
distribution (D1; i.e., assuming a reduction of diversity “with rule instructions”) or
higher values of γ from a heterogeneous distribution (D2; “without rule instructions”).
This change of γ was the main driver of the observed differences (see also Schlegelmilch,
Wills, & von Helversen, 2018).
With the D1 simulation, we wanted to approximate the performance in the study
of Nosofsky, Gluck, et al. (1994). In this study, however, the participants solved two
tasks and a significant practice effect was found such that performance generally
increased for the second task. To take this practice effect into account, we also slightly
increased the D1 λ distribution relative to D2, assuming that familiarization with the
stimuli facilitates binding them to categories in memory. The resulting learning curves,
shown in Figure 15, replicate both the classic ordinal pattern of learning with strong
contrasting (D1) and the revised pattern (reduced Type II learning on average) with
weak contrasting (D2).
Figure 16 shows that CAL also captures the various observed distributions of
performance in the Six Problems. Following Kurtz et al. (2013), we calculated the
average accuracy over the first eight blocks of learning for each task and participant and
plotted the resulting simulated distributions11 against known empirical distributions.
Note, that the right-most bar within each histogram represents participants/samples
with three or fewer errors throughout 64 trials of learning (i.e., less than 5% errors).
The simulated distribution of accuracy for the classic ordinal pattern
(Figure 16D1) is closely similar to the corresponding empirical distribution found in
Nosofsky, Gluck, et al. (1994). Further reducing contrasting (increasing γ in D2) while
assuming wider individual variations achieves a similar degree of overlap with the data
11 To simulate empirical measurement error or random deviations when ‘guessing’, we used CAL’s
predicted response accuracy in each sample as the probability of a binomial distribution with 64
observations. This allowed CAL’s simulated response distributions to extend below 0.5.
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from Exp. 2 in Kurtz et al. (2013), although CAL, with the given parameter sampling,
achieves above 95% accuracy less frequently than observed. However, CAL captures the
finding that the reduced Type II performance, which is observed in the absence of rule
instructions, is accompanied by a change in the shape of the distribution.
In two additional simulations, we also wanted to approximate the response
distributions observed in Lewandowsky (2011) and Rehder and Hoffman (2005a), which
show a diverse pattern of responding. CAL can account for these distributions by
assuming that study differences affect the strength of memorization. That is, in the
study of Lewandowsky (2011), the participants solved all Six Problems in two learning
sessions. Similar to Nosofsky, Gluck, et al. (1994), Lewandowsky (2011) observed very
strong practice effects but without finding a substantial Type II advantage, as also
discussed in terms of ‘no rule instructions’ by Kurtz et al. (2013). Thus, we held γ
constant as for D2 and increased CAL’s memory strength parameter (Figure 16D3),
which well approximates the observed response distributions in Lewandowsky (2011).
Note, however, that this parameter change, of course, does not explain why practice
effects might strengthen memory, but the descriptive account points towards a possible
explanation of a beneficial influence of stimulus familiarization (see further discussion of
‘Synthesizing Rules and Memory-Based Inference’).
Finally, Figure 16D4 shows a simulation held against the data of Rehder and
Hoffman (2005a). Although there are only N = 18 participants in each of the four
tested Types, giving rise to a rather unsystematic clustering of participants, we included
a simulation as the data substantially deviated from the classic ordinal pattern (i.e., I <
IV < II = VI in the first 64 trials). Interestingly, the major difference to the other
studies lies in the use of eye-tracking methods, which require strong spatial separation
of the stimulus features for reliable measurement. Furthermore, the binary feature
values themselves were symbols (e.g., ‘?’ vs ‘!’), in contrast to otherwise typical
variations on a physical or quantitative dimension (e.g., size). Both aspects could
contribute to the low performance. To address the question of whether CAL would
predict the same pattern with lower memory strength (e.g., binding spatially separated
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objects in memory is more difficult) we took the settings of D2 but substantially
reduced memory encoding strength. As can be seen, despite the rather few data points,
CAL seems to describe the same population by assuming more difficult memory
encoding compared to simulation D2.
In summary, CAL can account for various learning outcomes in the Six Problems
based on psychologically plausible hypotheses. While the simulation of practice effects
via memory strength is rather descriptive, the predicted effect of rule instructions on
the tendency of contrasting (abstracting regularities) seems crucial, as it differentiates
the model’s predictions from other learning accounts.
Attention learning in Types I and II
We have shown in previous sections that the assumption of individual differences
in contrasting, together with contextual modulation, provides access to individual
differences in strategy-like behavior (rule-like vs similarity-like). This concerned the
peak-shift phenomenon and incomplete XOR, as well as to item-specific accuracy
patterns in linearly versus non-linearly separable category structures. For the Six
Problems (Shepard et al., 1961) we illustrated systematic effects of contrasting and
memorization and predicted response distributions.
In the following, we present a second approach to evaluate CAL from a
process-tracing perspective in two of the Six Problems, also aiming at illustrating the
model’s potential to measure indicators of the underlying cognitive abilities. Instead of
using random sampling for simulation, we optimized CAL’s parameters separately for
individual participants who solved the Type I and II of the Six Problems in the study of
Rehder and Hoffman (2005a), with N = 18 each. In this study, the authors also
obtained eye-tracking measures and we wanted to find out whether CAL, after being
optimized on the classification decisions of each participant, can then predict the
individual attention measures provided by eye tracking without further parameter
adjustment (this can also be conceptualized as a form of model cross-validation).
Therefore, the model was applied to the exact sequence of trials a participant saw, and
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its predictions were fit to the exact categorizations a participant made in each trial.
The detailed methods are explained in Appendix B.
CAL learns to pay attention to dimensions (αm) and their modulators (βn) to
focus on the strongest predictors of outcomes and errors. In the following, we explore
whether these parameters can predict individual eye-tracking trajectories trial-by-trial.
In line with the basic idea of the ‘eye-mind hypothesis’ (Just & Carpenter, 1980), we
assume that the learners’ search for information reflects their state of information
processing. However, while non-attention rather safely indicates lack of information
processing (excluding peripheral vision), it is less clear whether overt attention
measured with eye-tracking implies processing, visual search, or mind-wandering.
Nonetheless, it seems desirable to open up CL process hypotheses to empirical testing.
At least ALCOVE’s extension EXIT (Kruschke, 2001) has been used to hold attention
predictions against eye-tracking data (Kruschke, Kappenman, & Hetrick, 2005), making
“the assumption that attention allocated to a cue generates eye gaze to that cue” (p.
840). Similar views and corresponding process-tracing evidence can be found in other
decision domains, furthermore suggesting that attending to features relevant for a
decision or judgment is the most robust finding in eye-tracking studies of judgment and
decision-making (see Orquin & Loose, 2013; p. 196).
The central phenomenon to explain in eye-tracking studies that investigated the
Type I problem (e.g., Matsuka & Corter, 2008; Rehder & Hoffman, 2005a) is that
participants seldom allocate attention to just a single dimension trial-by-trial before
discovering the rule dimension; they only shift their focus to it subsequently (see
Figure 17, top left). As the authors of these studies discussed, this is a challenging
pattern for hypothesis-testing models (e.g., Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994) or
COVIS (Ashby et al., 1998) if one assumes that testing a rule for a single dimension
also generates exclusive attention to this dimension. Without this assumption, it seems
difficult to tell why overt attention shifts should be observed at all after solving the task
(for a more detailed discussion including other models see Matsuka & Corter, 2008).
The central prediction of CAL for Type I is that a rule dimension attracts
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Figure 17 . Type I and Type II eye-tracking results from Rehder and Hoffman (2005a)
and CAL’s attention predictions (y-axis; lines: thin = individuals, thick = average),
relative to the last decision error by the participants (trial 0, vertical line); the same
trial was used to anchor CAL’s predictions. For Type I and II the fixations are shown
for the one relevant and the one irrelevant dimension, respectively (horizontal dashed
lines serve as visual anchors for comparison).
attention after it has become a diagnostic predictor. Before this, CAL automatically
searches for modulators of erroneous rules, which can also hinder finding the correct
rule. For Type I, which has one relevant and two irrelevant dimensions, CAL applies
response gating of unsuccessful rules until the model learns about the relevant
dimension such that its internal accuracy reaches the defined 85% threshold, and only
then CAL finally ignores the modulators. When being optimized on each individual in
the data-set of Rehder and Hoffman (2005a), however, CAL simply seeks to
approximate the participants’ categorizations.
To derive the corresponding process data and predictions in Figure 17, we
calculated the participants’ fixation proportions based on all fixations in a given trial
(i.e., before and after the decision) and then calculated the trajectory on the relevant
dimension in Type I, relative to the last trial, in which a participant made an error
(dashed vertical line). Note, that two participants in Type I made their last error after
a period of correct responses. However, we kept these cases in the analysis, as they did
not change the pattern, despite showing a rule focus before their last error (in Type II
this happened in a few more cases).
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For CAL’s prediction we took the fit result of each participant (recall this is fit
only to the categorization decisions) and simply averaged the estimated αm and βn
parameters on each dimension (m = n) on every trial with active response gating, but
only took αm when the model stopped response gating (i.e., contextual modulation);
this is the same approach as we took in our 5-4 eye-tracking simulation. The predictions
for the Type I trajectories in the lower panel of Figure 17 show a clear correspondence
to the actual data. The predicted attention shift indicates CAL’s internal state that
allowed it to best fit the respective behavior. The slower increase of CAL’s attention
indicates continuous changes on αm and βn and the sudden boost in dimension focus
indicates that CAL stopped paying attention to modulators. Note, that a noisy fixation
sampling on top of CAL’s predictions would render the predictions almost
indistinguishable from the data.
We conducted the same analysis for the one irrelevant dimension in Type II,
depicted in the right column of Figure 17. The participants in this task, on average,
begin to ignore the irrelevant dimension about -10 to -20 trials before errors disappear,
but tend to equally distribute attention across all three dimensions before. CAL’s
prediction is very similar to this pattern. However, CAL tended to learn more quickly
than some fitted participants and ignored the irrelevant dimension earlier in these cases,
which pulls down the average trajectory by about 10% in trials -40 to -20. As also can
be seen, CAL only once completely failed to provide a correct attention prediction, for
which the model learned that the irrelevant dimension is the most diagnostic. However,
in this particular case, CAL estimated a memorization strategy, which CAL’s monitors
of rule diagnosticity do not necessarily reflect. We seek to address this current
limitation in future studies.
To show that the corresponding patterns are based on also individually accurate
predictions, and to shed more light on how CAL approximated the participants’ Type II
behavior, we present four example participants in Figure 18 together with CAL’s
predictions. Unfortunately, however, the data did not allow us to differentiate between
the two irrelevant dimensions in Type I, or the two relevant dimensions in Type II,
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because, beyond relevance, the mapping between the logical and physical dimensions
(which was counterbalanced) was unavailable, and we focused on the qualitative
characteristics.
As can be seen, CAL well captured the individual behavior of these participants
such that solving Type I was relatively sudden, and solving Type II was either sudden
(P44) or rather continuously incremental (P50). Besides the obvious match between the
respective attention trajectories, CAL’s parameters captured the learning differences
also on its parameter estimates. For Type I, CAL’s contrasting estimates for P29 and
P35 were γ = −1.51 and γ = 2.57, indicating the quick and slow learning of the simple
rule, respectively. Also, CAL estimated modulation strength with ω = 5 and
ω = −2.85, which indicates strong and weak response gating, respectively. The latter
(P35) is apparent in CAL’s chance predictions before solving the task. For P35 CAL
estimated virtually absent memory strength with λ = −10 (the lower limit during
fitting), indicating absent contribution from exemplar memory, while CAL estimated
λ = 0.49 for P29. Note, however, that λ is difficult to identify when participants hardly
make errors in Type I.
For P44 and P50 in Type II, respectively, CAL estimated contrasting with
γ = −0.70 and γ = −1.13, and modulation with ω = −1.64 and ω = −2.74. However,
while both seemed to find the modulation solution in relatively equal ways (solving the
task in about the same number of trials), as also indicated by the eye-tracking patterns,
CAL estimated a difference in memory strength with λ = −10 and λ = 1.24,
respectively. In contrast to Type I, these estimates meaningfully relate to individual
differences in the response characteristics. That is, P50 shows a probabilistic increase in
performance, while P44 solves the task rather suddenly. The probabilistic increase is
approximated via stimulus memory in Type II, while CAL’s contextual modulation
solution (i.e., without contribution from memory) will always be relatively sudden.
In sum, the brief analysis of CAL’s fixation predictions and parameter estimates
for the study of Rehder and Hoffman (2005a) highlights the model’s capability as a
process-tracing model. It also points towards potential applications of CAL as a
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Figure 18 . Example of behavior and fixation proportions of four participants (symbols;
two for Type I, left; and two for Type II, right) from Rehder and Hoffman (2005a) and
corresponding CAL predictions (lines). Upper panel Learning accuracy (y-axes; 1 =
correct) over single trials of learning (x-axes). Dashed lines mark the last error of the
participant. Lower panel Fixation proportions (y-axis; colors indicate relevance of
dimension) over learning trials. ‘Relevant’ attention predictions for P 39 overlap.
parameter-measurement model to test novel hypotheses about individual differences in
such cognitive abilities which may correlate with the processes of category learning.
The examples above provide merely a first glance.
General Discussion
Our goal was to propose a psychologically plausible account of how rule
representations are learned in the context of category learning. We call this theoretical
framework CAL, for Category Abstraction Learning. CAL combines mechanisms of
similarity-based generalization and dissimilarity-based contrast, acting on independent
feature dimensions, to generate rules for observed and unobserved stimuli. Higher-order
learning detects the contexts in which these rules produce systematic errors. CAL then
inhibits and re-maps these rules at the stage of behavioral execution (contextual
modulation), instead of correcting their underlying category representations. While this
leads to self-confirmatory biases towards simplistic (and sometimes wrong) rules, it also
allows the model to quickly solve complex category structures by partially applying the
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learned rules in different contexts. The important drivers of CAL’s behavior include two
separate but related attention-learning mechanisms, which reinforce learning about the
most subjectively diagnostic feature dimensions and the most subjectively effective
modulator dimensions.
Although the current implementation of CAL made use of only three adjustable
parameters, all of which are psychologically interpretable, CAL is nonetheless
structurally more complex than other category-learning models. However, we argue
that CAL’s structural complexity is justified because our fundamental assumptions
reflect a variety of empirical insights and ideas from successful psychological theories in
related cognitive domains. CAL is a synthesized framework with an explanatory scope
that covers traditional as well as novel behavioral observations in a variety of tasks;
tasks that were, thus far, either unexplained or only separately accounted for by a range
of qualitatively different models (e.g., Bayesian, exemplar or rule models).
Summary of Findings
In the current paper, we simulated CAL’s predictions under various category
structures and experimental manipulations. We demonstrated that CAL can
accommodate and explain the key phenomena of (1) individual differences in the
peak-shift phenomenon (Lee et al., 2018; Livesey & McLaren, 2009; Purtle, 1973), (2)
the classic ordering of task difficulty in the six classic problems of Shepard et al. (1961),
(3) the revised ordering of difficulty under the absence of rule instructions and their
underlying individual differences (Kurtz et al., 2013), (4) individual differences in
spontaneous rule extrapolation (Conaway & Kurtz, 2017), (5) the response pattern and
eye-movement data in the classic 5–4 problem, plus item-specific differences between
different studies of this problem (Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Rehder & Hoffman, 2005b),
(6) the learning advantage of non-linearly separable over linearly-separable category
structures (Medin & Schwanenflugel, 1981) and individual differences in item-specific
responding therein (Levering et al., 2019), and (7) individual-level attention shifts in
Type I and II of the Six Problems as measured by eye-tracking (Rehder & Hoffman,
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2005a).
One of our central motivations for developing CAL was to explain the different
ordering of task difficulty that is observed in Shepard et al.’s (1961) Six Problems in the
absence of explicit instructions to use rules (Kurtz et al., 2013; i.e., selectively slower
learning of Type II). We assumed that rule instructions increase the strength of
contrasting (dissimilarity-based abstraction), which in turn leads to contextual
modulation (detecting contexts of rule errors and successes) and hence quick learning in
Type II, relative to conditions without rule instructions. Our simulations confirm that
this explanation accounts for the observed data while also predicting other phenomena
that have not been explained or explained differently, such as individual differences in
peak-shift (Lee et al., 2018), or spontaneous rule extrapolation in incomplete XOR
(Conaway & Kurtz, 2017).
In the following sections, we discuss some of the wider implications from three
perspectives concerning CAL’s mechanisms: (1) rule learning, (2) attention and
modulation, and (3) memory-based inference. In each section, we also discuss CAL’s
limitations, potential improvements, and we conclude by discussing open questions in
the Future Directions section.
Generating Rules via Similarity and Contrast
Central to CAL’s formulation is the proposal that rule-like representations emerge
from the interaction of complementary similarity and dissimilarity mechanisms. This
idea deliberately blurs a widespread formal and theoretical distinction between
similarity-based and rule-based models of categorization (e.g. Ashby & Gott, 1988;
Medin & Schaffer, 1986; Nosofsky, 1986; Reed, 1972; see further Hahn & Chater, 1998;
Pothos, 2005). For instance, exemplar-based theories, which mainly hinge on similarity
functions (e.g., stimulus generalization; Shepard, 1987) to infer categories, are often
considered as a separate class of account (or cognitive process) to rule-based models, in
which category evidence usually increases with measures of distance to a decision
criterion (e.g., decision bound). By combining similarity and contrast on independent
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dimensions, CAL is sensitive to similarity but, over time, also evolves representations
akin to decision bounds. This core concept is not entirely unlike the SUSTAIN model,
which, while being based on similarity, also uses dissimilarity to existing clusters to
drive the formation of new clusters (Love et al., 2004).
The process of rule generation in CAL further includes the idea that prior
knowledge and lateral inhibition on each represented stimulus dimension influence how
much is learned. That is, during learning, strong prior beliefs (i.e., existing associations
between stimulus dimensions and outcomes) are self-reinforced (‘the rich get richer’),
and weaker associations on the same stimulus dimension are inhibited by stronger ones
(lateral inhibition). By so doing, CAL takes the most powerful assumptions from
exemplar-based and rule-based accounts (similarity and dissimilarity) along with
mechanisms common in Bayesian and associative learning models (e.g., prior weighting
and inhibition), and combines them at a common level of explanation (i.e., rule
dimensions, spatially represented in WM). Undoubtedly, this will raise some questions
about possible model mimicry as previously discussed for rules and similarity by Hahn
and Chater (1998). Nonetheless, the theoretical and empirical analyses of our formal
approach suggest that a sharp psychological distinction between similarity-based and
rule-based processes might be both inadequate and unnecessary.
Our assumption (see also Pothos, 2005; Verguts & Fias, 2009) is that there is a
single representational space for all of these processes, which spans a continuum of
behavioral outcomes. This idea addresses the commonly raised question of why
competing formal accounts (e.g., effortful rules versus automatic associations) often can
not clearly distinguish between different behavioral patterns (Barsalou, 1990; Griffiths
& Le Pelley, 2009; Lee et al., 2018; Rouder & Ratcliff, 2006). We argue, there are, at
this level, no sharply different cognitive processes to distinguish.
In future work, we plan to extend CAL to a wider range of tasks; perhaps most
pressingly to tasks in which more than two response categories are possible. In these
cases we would assume that the strength of contrastive generalization decreases with
the number of (expected but unobserved) categories, which provides a range of testable
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predictions (see also Davis & Love, 2010). It seems worthwhile to also consider
probability judgments in addition to categorical decisions, and probabilistic in addition
to deterministic category structures, both of which might provide further insight into
the mechanisms of response competition when probabilities drive decision making
(Wills et al., 2000). We also think the idea of self-affirmative rule-learning may be
particularly applicable to learning in probabilistic environments, for which we have
suggested the hypothesis that probabilistic errors reduce the informational value in the
process of storing rule exceptions (including investigations of error-discounting, e.g.,
Craig et al., 2011).
Our conceptualization of rule learning as occurring via separately represented
dimensions that are spatially aligned in WM (see also Morton et al., 2017; Oberauer,
2009) also has several implications. For instance, it is important to note that separating
dimensions or abstracting rules for each should be very difficult for highly integral
stimuli or non-continuous features, for which there seems to be empirical evidence (e.g.,
Kurtz et al., 2013; see also Kemp, 2012). In CAL, such difficulty could be captured by
assuming weaker generalization/contrasting across the dimensions or absence of
contextual modulation, but considering other structural representations could be an
alternative.
Finally, a central question in the current manuscript has been how one can
conceptualize learning of stable simple rules in situations where those the rules are
imperfect. This led us to consider alternatives to the traditional approach of gradient
descent on prediction error (e.g. Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). In this regard, our
approach is consistent with other recent attempts to move away from optimal-learning
principles, for example, separating error detection from error correction in explanations
of perceptual learning and heuristics and biases in judgment and decision making (e.g.,
M. R. Blair, Watson, & Meier, 2009; Gardner, 2019; Rahnev & Denison, 2018; Risen,
2016). In particular, we argue that the learning of basic rules to categorize stimuli is
not driven by prediction error. Instead, CAL’s self-affirmative (success-driven) learning
induces very simplistic and sometimes false rules (similar to superstition), which might
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also relate to learning social norms (e.g., Schmidt, Butler, Heinz, & Tomasello, 2016)
and lexical learning in early childhood (L. B. Smith, Jones, & Landau, 1996). We claim
that it is beneficial to generate and maintain rules which later produce systematic errors
because this supports being able to solve more complex decision tasks through the
contextual use of these rules. This leads to the further hypothesis that a system like
CAL, which learns simplistic rules and then ‘patches’ their systematic errors, might be
more successful in surviving in later uncertain/unknown environments (with changing
contexts) than a system that tries to learn ‘optimal’ rules that apply universally.
Attention Learning and Contextual Modulation
In CAL, diagnostic dimensions receive more attention relative to other dimensions,
which increases learning speed for these dimensions, but decreases learning about other
dimensions. This basic principle of attentional learning was derived from broad
empirical insights in category and reinforcement learning (e.g., Le Pelley et al., 2016),
and our results show that the proposed mechanistic implementation can predict
individual attention trajectories across category learning (in the study of Rehder and
Hoffman, 2005a).
For example, CAL accounts for the phenomenon that, in the Type I problem,
participants focus their attention on the single diagnostic dimension only after they
have stopped making decision errors. Accordingly, the joint use of eye movements and
decisions in the formal modeling of category learning seems like a promising direction
for future research. Such investigations could also provide deeper insights into the role
of the second attention mechanism we defined, which is concerned with attending to
cues that predict systematic rule errors (modulator attention); a process we described
as contextual modulation. Broadly speaking, if rules lead to decision errors, it is the
context that is blamed, not the rule itself. From the perspective of other rule models in
category learning, this approach is similar to that of RULEX, which systematically
increases the complexity of its hypotheses (Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994), while
ATRIUM (Erickson & Kruschke, 1998) would rather associate the rule to an exemplar
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that predicts its success. In CAL, the implementation of feature-based modulation of
simple rules, in contrast, comes with the notion of creating conditional hypotheses
based on single contextual features, which might find further application in other
decision domains.
For instance, despite different terminology, contextual modulation seems observable
in studies of reinforcement learning; specifically, the observation that attention is
directed at contexts if learned stimulus-response associations are extinguished, or from
a CAL perspective, if learned rules suddenly are erroneous (see further Nelson et al.,
2013; Romero, Vila, & Rosas, 2003; Rosas et al., 2013). This attention to the putative
causal factors of these errors (contexts), which can concern temporal or environmental
changes (see further Bouton, 1993), is the fundamental ability in CAL to modulate rule
predictions. This precisely predicts variations in Type II learning performance (Kurtz et
al., 2013; Nosofsky, Gluck, et al., 1994; Shepard et al., 1961), but also trial-by-trial eye
movements on stimulus features during Type II learning (Rehder & Hoffman, 2005a).
In line with the observation that animals have difficulties solving the Type II
category structure (e.g., V. M. Navarro et al., 2019; J. D. Smith et al., 2004) we view
contextual modulation as a mechanism of higher cognitive order, allowing goal-directed
application of rules for different stimuli (see also Lea et al., 2009; Morton et al., 2017).
However, as animals can recognize changing contexts in reinforcement learning (see
further Bouton, 1993), another consistent interpretation might be that humans are
quicker in recognizing separable dimensions or are more sensitive to contextual
modulation than animals. But there might be other factors that mediate learning
success, for instance, whether the context changes once (as in a typical extinction
procedure) versus just as often as the actual stimulus (i.e., if the modulating context is
part of the stimulus object, as in the classic Type II problem).
More generally, with CAL’s definition of modulation as cognitive or behavioral
control, investigations of its correlation with measures of working memory capacity or
executive functioning would warrant further examination in several areas, including
studies of category learning in children and the elderly (both of whom seem to be lower
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in executive control than young adults; see also Battaglia et al., 2018; Brocki & Bohlin,
2004; Craske, Liao, Brown, & Vervliet, 2012; Peña, Bedore, & Zlatic-Giunta, 2002), and
comparative studies of extinction, which appears to be somewhat context-specific and
has been suggested to be driven by inhibition of learned associations (e.g., Cobos et al.,
2013). Further studies suggest that executive functions are also impaired in anxiety,
developmental psychopathology, and brain damage, and that attentional control seems
to be impaired in schizophrenia (Ashby & O’Brien, 2005; Dakin & Frith, 2005;
Dovgopoly & Mercado, 2013; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007;
Garcia-Villamisar, Dattilo, & Garcia-Martinez, 2017; Haddon et al., 2011; Kéri, 2003;
Klinger & Dawson, 2001; Lipp & Vaitl, 1992; Lubow & Gewirtz, 1995; Oades, 1997;
Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996; Robinson, Goddard, Dritschel, Wisley, & Howlin, 2009).
One strength of formal models, like CAL, is the potential they offer to link results from
disparate populations within a common framework, aiding both diagnostic experimental
design and theoretical coherence.
In the current paper, we focused our specification of CAL on addressing a series of
one- and two-category structures with a few, largely well-defined, ordinal dimensions.
This was for simplicity, and because much of the available evidence concerns such
situations. Nonetheless, we see the CAL framework as also being able to provide
insights about rule learning and contextual modulation in more complex situations
(e.g., Conaway & Kurtz, 2017; Yang & Lewandowsky, 2003, 2004). Generalizing CAL’s
basic assumptions presented in this manuscript is a key topic for future research.
Synthesizing Rules and Memory-Based Inference
In contrast to the long-standing success of exemplar-based models of categorization
(e.g., Kruschke, 1992; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986; Reed, 1972; Miyatsu,
Gouravajhala, Nosofsky, & McDaniel, 2019) our hybrid rule-learning approach provided
an in-depth account of classic and more recently observed empirical phenomena. As
exemplar accounts are among the most popular theories this deserves more detailed
inspection.
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First, CAL incorporates the assumption that memory reduces to an exception
store if the model learns strong rules (‘knowing when to use memory’). With weak
rules, however, CAL equally but more slowly increases its memory strength for all
encountered stimuli. Hence, when learning includes repeatedly presenting the same
stimuli, then CAL predicts decision errors either due to weak/false rules or due to the
absence of strong category associations in configural memory. On a single dimension,
the resulting error gradients are similar to those of exemplar-similarity accounts, and we
view dis/similarity as key to accurate predictions (see also Shepard, 1987). With
multiple dimensions, the strength of exemplar-based predictions seems to lie in
(multiplicative) attention-weighted cue combination, which CAL can address via
contextual modulation of rules. These aspects seem to cover several phenomena that
have been formerly attributed to exemplar-similarity processing (e.g., Nosofsky, 1986;
Kruschke, 1992) or were previously unexplained. Nonetheless, CAL can engage in
strategic memorization with strong memory encoding to accumulate memory-based
evidence quickly, which, in turn, will override any rule-based prediction.
Second, CAL’s on-demand exception learning is similar to SUSTAIN (Love et al.,
2004), in the sense that SUSTAIN creates a new cluster when no existing cluster
correctly predicts the category of the current stimulus. However, unlike SUSTAIN, CAL
generalizes its instances only narrowly if their associations to the categories are strong.
Consequently, differences in CAL’s predictions for retrieved instances are primarily
driven by how strongly they were encoded during learning. A similar type of memory
strength has been defined in exemplar models (e.g., as a free parameter; see further
Pothos & Wills, 2011). However, in exemplar models, increases in exemplar-memory
strength increase the weight of that exemplar in the summed similarity computation
(for an alternative, see Hu & Nosofsky, 2021). In contrast, increasing memory strength
in CAL reduces the exemplar’s generalization (or interference). This theoretically
commits CAL to the idea that abstraction is mainly driven by the rule-learning
network, and strong memorization is more akin to stimulus identification. In other
words, in exemplar models (e.g., GCM Nosofsky, 1986), if the memory strength
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parameter of an exemplar becomes stronger, an increase in its recall accuracy is
predicted, while a decrease in accuracy for exemplars from other categories is also
predicted (see also Hendrickson, Perfors, Navarro, & Ransom, 2019; Homa et al., 2019;
Schlegelmilch & von Helversen, 2020), similar to a recall bias. In CAL, increasing the
memory strength of a stored instance increases its recall accuracy and decreases its
interfering influence on category inferences for dissimilar instances.
The current success of CAL leads us to argue that future investigations might also
benefit from considering different types of memory stores. When learning imperfect
rules, switching between these rules (in search for a better one), might also concern
discarding exceptions of previous rules (see also Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994).
From this perspective, it seems possible to conceive exception memory as a temporary
sub-set of active instances in short-term memory, which could be the active part of a
more durable long-term store (Cowan, 1999). Interestingly, a long-term store should
become more stable over time (stimulus familiarization), which might also provide an
explanatory account of practice effects with extensive training (e.g., Lewandowsky,
2011), such that it might become easier to activate sub-sets of exemplars or exceptions
to bind them to (new) responses. However, it also seems worthwhile to consider a
memory store for rule representations (see also Kalish et al., 2004; Sewell &
Lewandowsky, 2011), which may be relevant to the debate over competing versus
conflicting representational memory systems (see Morton et al., 2017; Poldrack &
Foerde, 2008; Seger & Braunlich, 2015).
Future Directions
The theoretical framework that guided the implementation of CAL’s hypotheses is
applicable beyond the paradigms considered in this article. For instance, the hypotheses
of attention-driven learning and contextual modulation could predict the frequently
studied phenomenon known as the inverse base-rate effect (Medin & Edelson, 1988; for
a comprehensive review see Don, Worthy, & Livesey, 2021). Consider a learning phase
that pairs singleton stimuli (e.g., S1 or S2) with outcomes (e.g., O1 or O2), presenting
S1 & S2 → O1 three times and S1 & S3 → O2 once. Thus, S1 itself is not diagnostic of
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any outcome, but observing O1 three times more often than O2 leads participants to
respond O1 when later presented with S1 (i.e., according to the base rate). Of
particular interest is the non-rational tendency to respond O2 when participants are
presented with S2 & S3 in a later test phase (i.e., S3 dominates the decision, although
S2 was observed three times and S3 once).
From a CAL perspective, first, note that the frequent presentation of S1 & S2 →
O1 introduces a trial order effect that frequently leads to learning the rules ‘S1 predicts
O1’ and ‘S2 predicts O1’ first. If participants then encounter S1 & S3 → O2, the rule
‘S1 leads to O1’ would be erroneous in the presence of S3. Here, CAL would treat S3 as
a modulating context that inverts the learned rule when S3 is present (which also
prevents strongly storing S1 & S3 as compound in configural memory). Contextual
modulation, thus, could predict an inverse-base rate effect if the the modulating context
S3 generalizes to the rule S2 → O1, which is correlated with S1 → O1.
The question of whether modulators (e.g., S3) may generalize to correlated
dimensions is speculative at this stage. However, it has been argued that probabilistic
errors (e.g., defined as S1 leads to O1 in 75% of the cases) trigger attention to
correlated stimulus features (Little & Lewandowsky, 2009a). The assumption would
also be in line with theories of ‘associative mediation’ and ‘acquired equivalence’ (e.g.,
Hall, Mitchell, Graham, & Lavis, 2003; Meeter, Shohamy, & Myers, 2009; further
discussed below). Importantly, the hypothesis can be tested since CAL would also make
the novel predictions that with contextual modulation the O1 vs O2 response
distribution for S2 & S3 should be bi-modal, just as the Type II performance without
rule instructions (Kurtz et al., 2013), and that preventing contextual modulation during
learning (e.g., due to cognitive load) or rule instructions would affect the tendency of
responding S2 & S3 → O2, which warrants further investigations.
However, the current formal implementation of CAL is tailored to
category-learning paradigms with quasi-continuous dimensions. That is, a full account
of traditional learning phenomena, such as the IBRE, requires considerations of how
CAL represents singleton stimuli and contextual modulation of correlated dimensions.
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First, it is not immediately obvious how singleton cues as in the just described
paradigms could be represented on dimension nodes in CAL. More generally, it is an
open question of what constitutes a stimulus feature or modulator in the first place,
beyond highly integral stimuli. For instance, Shepard et al. (1961) reported that
participants after extensive training noticed that the Type VI problem can be
immediately solved by remembering the first stimulus and then simply counting
whether any subsequent stimulus shares an odd or even number of features. Such
predictions, in CAL, would require pre-processing this information at a meta-stage into
a spatial format. Such deeper considerations could also open up the CAL framework for
comparison to a different type of structuring models that make use of more abstract
predicate logic to learn conceptual differentiation depending on the stimulus format
(Goodman, Tenenbaum, Feldman, & Griffiths, 2008; Kemp, 2012). It seems worth
exploring the space of hypotheses (e.g., conjunctions, disjunctions, conditionals) that
could be generated on any type of stimulus representation, in comparison between
modulation mechanisms as in CAL and other structuring approaches.
For phenomena like the IBRE, the more basic question about potential stimulus
representations further extends to abstractions based on the presence and absence of
singleton cues. For instance, the absence of a cue could induce inference of regularities
for the unobserved cue (e.g., if S1 is missing and O1 is observed, then observing S1
predicts a different outcome) but contrasting could as well operate at a
cross-dimensional level (e.g., if S1 predicts O1, then other cues such as S3 must predict
other outcomes). As each of these assumptions is compatible with the CAL framework,
corresponding investigations might also help to pin down fundamental differences
between rule representations (including abstract features, such as cue absence or
structural features) and configural memory (for observable stimulus elements). In this
vein, applying the proposed learning hypotheses on various types of (compatible)
stimulus or problem features highlights CAL’s potential to guide theoretical
development in future work in different domains.
CAL’s rule-generating mechanisms might be applicable beyond the trial-by-trial
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category-learning tasks considered in this article; for example, in situations where
people generate (creatively imagine) novel instances for unobserved categories. Children
tend to assign unlabeled objects to newly presented categories based on feature
dissimilarity to objects of known categories, implying basic representations of concepts
as mutually exclusive (Landau et al., 1988; Markman & Wachtel, 1988). Thus, despite
uncertainty about what might constrain the number and diversity of abstracted,
unobserved categories (which seems to influence contrastive mechanisms; Austerweil et
al., 2019; Davis & Love, 2010), contrasting as implemented in CAL (i.e., without
exemplars or clusters) might be a driving force behind category generation. That is,
CAL could be easily extended to test additional hypotheses about unsupervised
learning or category generation (i.e., without external error feedback).
Unsupervised learning can be studied in different ways. For example, Livesey and
McLaren (2009) have shown that learning still occurs when participants are tested on
transfer items (or in an extinction phase) after normal category (or reinforcement)
learning. In their experiments, the response gradients became more rule-like with
ongoing testing (for similar rule-transitions see Bourne Jr, Healy, Parker, & Rickard,
1999; Johansen & Palmeri, 2002a). CAL naturally accommodates this kind of effect
under the assumption that, in the absence of feedback, the model’s prediction of
category membership is used to drive self-affirming teaching signals. Consistent with its
other self-reinforcing mechanisms, this would strengthen existing rules, leading to the
observed changes in response gradients. Under such circumstances, CAL would also
translate prior memory-based predictions into rules, which seems like an interesting
avenue for future research.
Another way of studying unsupervised learning is through category construction
(e.g., Ashby, Queller, & Berretty, 1999; Austerweil et al., 2019; Love, 2003; Medin,
Wattenmaker, & Hampson, 1987; Pothos & Chater, 2002). In this case, CAL could be
adapted to choose a first stimulus category randomly, as well as a salient feature, and
then, again, learn in a self-confirmatory fashion. This would lead to narrower category
boundaries with strong contrasting than with weak contrasting. An interesting
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prediction from this mechanism would be that none of CAL’s error-driven mechanisms
would play a role (exception learning, contextual modulation). This would predict a
major preference for very simplistic categorization rules (e.g., no disjunctive structures,
no exceptions), which seems in line with some existing empirical evidence (e.g., Ashby
et al., 1999).
Conclusion
Our investigations have provided insights into a variety of category learning
paradigms. The described simulations and analyses consistently support CAL’s
assumptions about interacting mechanisms related to similarity-based generalization
and contrasting, attention learning on two levels, contextual modulation, and configural
memory. These assumptions challenge long-standing theoretical and formal concepts of
category learning and provide a fresh perspective on a variety of findings in the field of
category and reinforcement learning. We believe CAL has the potential to explain a
range of other benchmark phenomena in a coherent theoretical and formal framework,
but that is a matter for future work.
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Appendix A - Exponential or Gaussian generalization?
It may be worth briefly expanding on our choice of a Gaussian decay gradient to
drive generalization in CAL. Shepard (1987) suggested that generalization might follow
an exponential gradient, while other researchers pointed out that Gaussian gradients are
commonly observed in human learning (e.g., Ennis, 1988; Nosofsky, 1988). A discussion
in the literature led to the conclusion that a Gaussian decay is appropriate if assuming
uncertainty about exact ‘locations’ of stimuli in psychological space, or perceptual noise
(see also Shepard, 1958; Ennis & Shepard, 1988). This type of uncertainty might be a
part of any process that requires active maintenance of stimulus representations in
working memory (see also Staddon & Reid, 1990), as opposed to (rather rare) situations
in which, for instance, a (small) set of visual stimuli are permanently and completely
visible during learning, or simply depending on the task goal (e.g., categorization vs
identification; Lovibond et al., 2020). While this, indeed, may often be a valid
assumption, a number of animal-learning studies further suggest that response gradients
can change over time from broad Gaussian to more sharply peaked gradients (see
further Mackintosh, 1974; Thompson, 1958, 1959; see also Gluck & Myers, 1993),
showing that clear differentiation can be a consequence of experience. This evidence and
the theoretical considerations motivated our use of the Gaussian gradient in our basic
learning functions, while further assuming interactions with other learning mechanisms
that reduce uncertainty with ongoing rule learning, just as we assumed that enhanced
memorization of a stimulus narrows its generalization during memory-based inference.
However, we think that investigating whether the Gradients can change between
different experimental set-ups or tasks, seems worth investigating in future studies.
Appendix B - Model Optimization and Parameter Estimates
For the individual fits, we optimized one set of parameters (γ, λ, ω) for each
participant individually, based on the trial-wise categorizations in the exact same trial
sequence. For optimization, we used a differential evolution algorithm (e.g. Storn &
Price, 1997). Such algorithms work by assuming NP parents in each generation. Each
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parent is a set of model parameters, randomly selected for generation zero. These
parents are mutated to create children, with the best-fitting children surviving to
become parents. The process is repeated for G generations to estimate the optimal
model parameters.
We set NP to 100, which exceed the minimum recommended values of 10 parents
per parameter (Ardia et al., 2016), and set G to 500. We also inspected the sampling
procedure for different random seeds. They appeared to have little impact on the
overall results but in very few cases changed how the model described the participant
(rule learning vs memorization), which is not surprising as the model is highly
non-linear and trial-order dependent in fitting. However, these cases were negligible,
and the estimates reported for CAL are characteristic of the typical fits observed across
these multiple runs, and we did not change our random seed selection between
participants manually. We sampled the values between [-5, 5] for γ and ω, and between
[-10, 10] for λ. Note that if γ becomes very large > 3 it will eventually stop rule
learning because the similarity gradient becomes virtually horizontal, and the dimension
nodes are capped at .001 and .999 after the update. With horizontal generalization /
contrasting thus, the dimension update reduces to almost zero, and thus clearly indicate
that a participant was best approximated by assuming pure memorization. Likewise, if
λ would become -10, then the model best approximated the participant with pure rule
learning and modulation, but without storing rule exceptions.
